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ABSTRACT
SUSTAINABILITY IN THE APPAREL INDUSTRY:
A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS AND LOGIC
HYBRIDIZATION PROCESSES
MAY 2017
YOOJUNG AHN, B.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY
M.A., COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Steven W. Floyd

Scholars have sought to understand the relationship between organizations and
institutions, and research to date has generated findings that speak to both the top down
effects of institutions on organizations as enabling and constraining, and the bottom up
influence of organizations shaping institutions. This dissertation explores the context of
sustainability in the apparel industry and inquires how organizations participate in selfregulation to influence institutional change, using a mixed methods approach to
understand this question. In particular, I observe the process of building a specific selfregulatory institution – the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC).
First, I study the impact of a reputation crisis on the different ways firms attend to
sustainability, and hypothesize that threat attention firms will be more likely to join the
self-regulatory institution. I deploy a Cox Model event history analysis and find that
indeed threat attention firms are more likely to participate in the self-regulatory
institution. Second, I focus on the founding firms of the SAC – Patagonia, Walmart, and
Nike – to inductively investigate the process of building a novel institutional logic around
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sustainability as a result of hybridization of founding firms’ disparate logics. I find that
through dominating, contesting, and assimilating processes, a novel hybridized logic for
the SAC is constructed embodying new values such as interdependence and
transformation, as well as standardization and self-assessment practices. The findings of
this dissertation make theoretical contributions to the institutional logics perspective, selfregulatory institutions, and research on sustainability. They also have practical
implications towards understanding how sustainability measurement indices and a
distinct organizational structure to govern a self-regulatory institution influence the
diffusion of sustainability.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“…Mr. Knight emphasized today that using objective observers to monitor
working conditions would serve not just Nike, but eventually American apparel industry
in general. “We believe that these are practices which the conscientious, good companies
will follow in the 21st century. These moves do more than just set industry standards.
They reflect who we are as a company.” - Philip H. Knight, CEO of Nike, New York
Times, May 18, 1998.
The intricate relationship between industry and organizations is a concern for
many organizational scholars. The above quote by the CEO of Nike following the
sweatshop crisis exemplifies this complex association. As such, scholars have inquired
how organizations deal with this interaction and interdependence between industry and
organizations, one of which is collective action (Ostrom, 2015; Olson, 2009; Hardin,
1982). Organizations often engage in collective action at the industry level as to achieve
joint ends, and to tackle collective issues together (King & Lenox, 2000). In particular,
work on self-regulatory institutions, or private decentralized institutions, connotes the
fact that organizations voluntarily enter into institutional arrangements rather than
remaining a passive receiver of institutional pressures (Ingram & Silverman, 2002;
Gunningham & Rees, 1997). The role of these self-regulatory institutions is to create a set
of voluntary standards and rules that relate to the conduct of those firms in an industry
(Lenox, 2006). This dissertation focuses on two aspects about self-regulatory institutions:
(1) how firms respond differently to a reputation crisis to show disparate behaviors in
participating in a self-regulatory institution, and (2) the mechanism and process of
creating a self-regulatory institution through the hybridization of the different
institutional logics that are instantiated in the founding firms of this self-regulatory
institution. To explore these two questions, I conduct two different studies that
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respectively deploy event history analysis and a case study method to ultimately conduct
a mixed method study. I specifically focus on the apparel industry and a distinctive selfregulatory institution in this industry for sustainability (i.e. Sustainable Apparel
Coalition) to understand the research questions.
The first study focuses on a reputation crisis and the joining of firms in a selfregulatory institution. Past research suggests that a reputation crisis, such as the
sweatshop crisis in the apparel industry, impact organizations differently depending on
how they perceive of this issue (e.g. Yu & Lester, 2008; Schnietz & Epstein, 2005;
Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). As such, I explore the different ways firms attend to
sustainability after a reputation crisis, and whether differences in attention patterns
contribute to participation in a self-regulatory institution. More specifically, I posit that
firms will vary in their participation in self-regulatory institutions depending on how they
view sustainability after the crisis, in terms of threat or opportunity. I propose that firms
that attend to sustainability as a threat will be more likely to engage in collective behavior
and become involved in a self-regulatory institution early on relative to other firms, while
those who attend to sustainability as an opportunity will be more likely to join later in a
self-regulatory institution. In addition, I also develop hypotheses about other firm-level
factors such as firm performance and the visibility of firms predicting participation in a
self-regulatory institution.
The second study zooms in on the founding organizations of the self-regulatory
institution, and incorporates an institutional logics lens to build a process model of logic
hybridization. Institutional logics are a set of socially constructed organizing principles
and practices that guide behavior (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008;
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Thornton, 2004; 1999). Scholars have generated empirical findings that logics are the
sources of conflict and negotiation between institutional orders and actors (Thornton,
Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). Actors in an institutional environment are exposed to and
influenced by various signals and pressures from multiple institutional logics
(Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010). To deal with this, organizations purposefully
combine seemingly contesting logics to create new hybrid organizational forms and
practices. Hence, multiple logics allow for the creation of new organizational forms and
practices (Purdy & Gray, 2009). A self-regulatory institution is one such new
organizational form embodying the values and practices of its membership, which are not
merely additive. Due to its voluntary nature and the collective goal to reduce the pooled
risk of the participating members (Lenox, 2006; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002), it
requires the purposeful recombination of existing logics of the members to arrive at a
common point of departure where the new values and practices of the collective can
manifest. Hence, self-regulatory behavior can be considered as one result of logic
hybridization that is less explored.
To further understand the founding firms of a self-regulatory institution, I
undertake an inductive study of firms creating the Sustainable Apparel Coalition after the
sweatshop crisis in the late 90’s. Drawing on an analysis of industry and firm-level
archival data in conjunction with interview data, I find that the three founding firms of
the Sustainable Apparel Coalition were distinct in their sets of logics, which went through
a hybridization process over time resulting in hybridized values such as interdependence
and transformation. Moreover, analyses show that the collective is using unique practices
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– standardization and self-assessment – to impact the whole industry including
stakeholders.
In summary, this dissertation focuses on two research questions: 1) how does the
threat and opportunity perceptions around sustainability impact the joining of a coalition
after a reputation crisis; and 2) for those firms that initiate a coalition, what is the process
of creating a hybridized logic for the collective? In addressing these questions, this
dissertation makes several important contributions to three different bodies of literature.
First, this study aims to enrich the institutional logics literature by understanding the
motivation behind how firms show disparate responses to a reputation crisis and engage
in collective behavior, and explaining self-regulatory institutions as a result of hybridized
logics to uncover the anteceding processes of new logic formation for a collective. The
process model of logic development incorporating the hybridization of logics by
founding firms speaks to the upward influence of firms on institutions, while the
influence of logic change to firms in the industry connotes a downward impact. This
thereby contributes to building the micro-foundations of institutional theory, including
both a “built up” focus where micro-level interactions aggregate over time and replace
old macro-level coherence, and macro-orders that are “pulled down” to inflict macrolevel effects in organizations and individuals (Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Thornton et al.,
2012).
Much of the early empirical work on logics remains at the macro-level in fields or
industries and illustrated logic shifts over time (Haveman & Rao, 1997, Thorton, 2002,
Lounsbury, 2002), Recent work includes a more intricate account of complicated logics
and focuses on how they affect the behavior of not just the industry as a whole but also
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firms, groups, and individuals (cf. Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013). Not only that,
research has flourished on the impact of individuals, groups, and organizations in
managing and interacting with the logics and actively negotiating environments
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Boxenbaum, 2006). This paper adds to the discussion of
this interaction between logics and organizations, inclusive of decision makers inside
them, and explains some of the intricacies around firm’s attention patterns, as well as
other firm-level factors that may influence firms to engage in activities such as forming
self-regulatory institutions.
The second contribution of this study is elaborating on the process of new logic
emergence through a self-regulatory institution. While the diverse sets of institutional
logics and how they impact organizations and individuals are studied to a great extent,
the processes of how new institutional logics emerge and get constructed through the
combining of the distinct logics are not explored fully. This dissertation elaborates on
these processes to capture the sequence of processes that antecedes new logic formation,
and adds to the body of literature on logic emergence and origins, which notes repertoires
and categories of ideas as antecedents (e.g. Navis & Glynn, 2010). In particular, this
dissertation helps to uncover the processes that underlie a new, distinct logic that a selfregulatory institution embodies such as dominating of a logic, contesting between logics,
and assimilating values and practices, which stem ultimately from the disparate logics
that are instantiated in the distinct founding firms. This helps to add to the better
understanding of self-regulatory institutions and their role in impacting institutional
change.
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The last contribution of this dissertation is to the research stream on sustainability.
Especially, it helps to enhance the understanding of diffusion of sustainability in an
industry. Sustainability research has recognized the importance of self-regulatory
institutions to promote industry-wide collaboration to minimize environmental and social
risks (Barnett & King, 2008; King & Lenox, 2000). This paper will enrich the
understanding of how this self-regulatory institution can act as an engine for diffusion of
sustainability to industry members and its stakeholders, as they gain membership in the
self-regulatory institution and join in building its core practice. It thereby builds on and
extends the work on institutional perspectives of corporate sustainability (Bansal, 2005;
Delmas & Toffel, 2004; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995).
At the end, this dissertation will ultimately strive to foresee the self-regulatory
institution as an engine for stabilizing a specific dominant logic for the industry, perhaps
a new one (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King,
1991) These dominant logics then focus the attention of actors on particular features of
organizations and their environment, as well as shape different selections of strategies.
Through the attention focus to dominant logics, firms build identity, goal, and schema
around the area of attention (Thorton et al., 2012). Thus, the creation of a collective such
as the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, and gaining enough membership over time, will
help to instill a dominant logic for the industry.
In the next chapters, I first provide a brief overview of the relevant literature and
propose a set of related but distinct research questions. I then develop two studies that
explore the research questions in the context of the apparel industry. First, I develop
hypotheses for an event history study to understand firms’ joining of a coalition. Second,
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I conduct an inductive case study of the Sustainable Apparel Coalition and its formation
by its founding members to build a process model for logic hybridization that informs the
understanding of a new logic for the collective. After discussing data, methods, and
results from these mixed methods studies, I conclude with a discussion of the
implications of these findings to the institutional logics perspective and studies of
sustainability and self-regulatory institutions. I also summarize several practical
implications of this work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides background on the theoretical foundations of this
dissertation. The first section discusses the foundations of the institutional logics
perspective and the different ways that institutional logics interact and combine to
provide for institutional change. The second section reviews prior research on firm selfregulatory behavior and self-regulatory institutions and discusses the motivation and
outcomes of self-regulation among firms. The third section reviews the extant literature
on definitions and perspectives regarding corporate sustainability and summarizes the
research findings in this area. Finally, the last section integrates the three bodies of
literature and other relevant theories to inform the research questions that the dissertation
explores.

2.1. Institutional logics
2.1.1. Definition and foundations
Institutional logics are cultural beliefs and rules that are socially shared to shape
actors’ cognitions and behaviors and provide a framework for reasoning and organizing
activities (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thorton, 2004; Lounsbury, 2007). Simply put,
institutional logics provide the “rules of the game” which guide the practices and ideas of
a society. Examples of institutional logics include editorial versus market orientation in
the publishing businesses (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) and a national versus community
banking orientation (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). Noticing individual and
organizational actors and how institutions constrain and enable them became a key point
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of departure for the development of the institutional logics perspective (Thorton &
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2004; Lounsbury, 2002; Thorton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).
While stemming from the variants of neoinstitutional theoretical views of isomorphism
and legitimacy from Meyer & Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983),
Friedland & Alford (1991) further focused in on cultures – multiple rationalities – as well
as the mindful cognition that lacked in the developments in neo-institutional theory thus
far.
The four foundational principles of institutional logics are, 1) the duality of
agency and structure, 2) institutions are material and symbolic, 3) institutions are
historically contingent and 4) institutions work at multiple levels (Thornton et al., 2012).
These four principles are applicable to how they enable and constrain individual and
organizational behavior. First, agency and structure are both present and in action within
the institutional logics framework, and they are autonomous while interdependent. At the
core of the institutional logics perspective is that the interests, identities, values, and
assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded within existing logics
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Both social structure and individual agency are at play when
institutional logics guide the behavior and cognitions of individuals and organizations.
The interinstitutional system is an important conception in the institutional logics
perspective, that provides the ideal-typical logics of institutional orders and categories. It
is a representation of the interinstitutional system by constructing categories to simplify
and organize them for better analysis (Doty & Glick, 1994; Thornton et al., 2012). The
ideal typical logics act as a tool to interpret cultural meanings into their components and
help to identify the instantiations of institutional logics in the practices and values of
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organizations and individuals. Appendix 1 portrays the elements of the ideal-typical
institutional logics derived from the literature (Thornton et al., 2012). The ideal types
help to identify instantiations of the logics and to understand the development and
extensions of these logics.
2.1.2. Emergence and change of institutional logics
Then, how does an institutional logic emerge, develop, and stabilize in the
industry? Logics can emerge due to external influence and the redefinition of “what the
most important things are” (Thorton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). For example,
following the Bhopal crisis, there was a change in how observers viewed the risks of
chemical manufacturing, and risk associated with chemical manufacturing was
emphasized in media reports (Barnett & King, 2008). Events like Bhopal provide guiding
principles for matching the appropriate types of practices to specific problems and
rhetorics accounting for why organizations should change to incorporate new practices,
and thereby contribute to building a new logic for the industry (Kono, Palmer, Freidland,
& Zafonte, 1998; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Dominant logics may prevail when logics
contest (Greenwood et al., 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Meyer et al., 1987), and
conflicting logics may coexist (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005).
Also, hybridization of logics may incur a new form of logics (York, Hargrave, &
Pacheco, 2016; Battilana & Dorado, 2010).
Researchers have inquired about the emergence of logics. Communication and
join attention to field-level practices is at the core of the field-level institutional logics.
The ability of participants to communicate and attend to practices is based on their
common ground, defined as the set of knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions that they
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believe they share (Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark, 1992). Common ground is based on a
set of material objects and practices participants share (Bechky, 2003), as well as on a
common vocabulary of speech and writing about those practices. Common ground is
thereby critical for coordination and collective action. As narratives create system of
categories that link category labels to field-level organizing practices (Kennedy, 2008;
Navis & Glynn, 2010), distinct institutional logics emerge.
Many different forms of field-level logic change have been studied. Changes in
logics involve a combination of changes in narratives and practices, resulting in new
vocabularies in the institutional field, by which changing theories, frames, and narratives
are linked to changes in practices. Both external and internal forces affect change in
logics. “Blending, Replacement, Segregation” refer to transformational change, while
“Assimilation, Elaboration, and Expansion/Contraction” refer to developmental change.
Glynn & Lounsbury (2004) studies the blending of institutional logics – which is
combining different dimensions of diverse logics. Studies have more recently started to
distinguish blending, assimilation, and hybridization of logics (Battilana & Lee, 2014;
Battilana & Dorado, 2010; York et al., 2016). Hybridization is a process where
organizations combine multiple, often in compatible logics to be re-compatible (Tracey et
al., 2011; Mars & Lounsbury, 2009), and hybridization of logics can occur at the field
level (York et al., 2016). These processes contribute to the change and development of
institutional logics and brings organizational and institutional change.
2.1.3. Micro-foundations of institutional logics and dominant logics
Change in logics impact the field by shifting the attention of firms. The
institutional logics perspective fundamentally embodies the attention-based view, which

11

states that logics focus decision maker attention on specific sets of issues and solutions
(Ocasio, 1997), and consequently they influence organizations’ decisions as to whether to
adopt specific practices. This is based on Simon’s (1947) initial argument that decisionmakers are overloaded with information that they cannot attend to simultaneously, thus
they selectively attend to the ones that considered to be the most relevant at that moment
in the environment. One strand of research in this tradition has emphasized how a
dominant institutional logic originates and uniformly shapes organizations, either
reinforcing the spread of a practice that conforms to the increasingly dominant
institutional logic (Thornton, 2002) or accelerating the abandonment of an old,
increasingly illegitimate logic (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994).

2.2. Self-regulatory Institutions
2.2.1. Definition and research findings
Self-regulatory institutions are entities that firms in an industry create and
voluntarily abide by a set of governing rules (King & Lenox, 2000; Prakash & Potoski,
2006). They distinguish themselves from formal institutions as it operates through
informal constraints like norms of behavior or self-imposed codes of conduct (Ingram &
Clay, 2000). Self-regulatory institutions have been studied mainly from a policy
standpoint, with Ostrom (2015; 1998)’s work most prominent. The theory posits that
when actors could negotiate, observe, and enforce compliance with common rules, selfregulatory institutions could “gain the benefits of trade, provide mutual protection against
risk, and to create and reinforce rules that protect natural resources” (Ostrom, 2000: 138).
Many have been skeptical about the ability of entities to govern themselves (Ostrom,
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2008; Lloyd, 1833; Hardin, 1982, 2009), and have noted of the “tragedy of the
commons,” where the shared-ness of certain resources due to self-regulation inevitably
generates more selfish consumption of that resource by individual actors. Regardless, the
field has witnessed the creation of many such organizations in many industries including
agriculture, biotech, accounting, and the chemical industry.
Self-regulatory institutions, while prominent in sociology and economics early on,
have been largely overlooked in the management field until fairly recently, but many
scholars have begun to recognize the importance and ponder the implications and
determinants of such institutions (Furman & Stern, 2011; Jiang & Bansal, 2003; King &
Lenox, 2000; Barnett & King, 2008). Furman & Stern (2006) considered the importance
of self-regulatory institutions on promoting scientific discoveries, while Jiang & Bansal
(2003) explored the motivations to engage in certification schemes such as the ISO
without coercive pressures. King & Lenox (2000) focused on the chemical industry and
discussed the potential for opportunism to overcome the isomorphic pressures and argued
that industry self-regulation is difficult to maintain without explicit sanctions. Barnett &
King (2008) further discussed the spillover of one firm’s actions to another and motivated
the need to create self-regulatory institutions.
2.2.2. Motivations of self-regulation
The purpose of self-regulatory institutions is for companies to collectively avoid a
threat or pursue a common good by establishing a code of conduct. It differs from the
government-led industry programs regulated through sanctions in that there is no explicit
coercive pressure. Hence, researchers have considered industry self-regulation as the
solution to the reputations commons problem (Yue & Ingram, 2012). After the Bhopal
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crisis, for instance, firms created the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association of
Responsible Care to monitor and co-work the practices of the chemical industry (Rees,
1997). Self-regulatory institutions have been largely overlooked in the management field
until fairly recently, but many scholars have begun to recognize the importance and
ponder the implications and determinants of such institutions (Furman & Stern, 2006;
Jiang & Bansal, 2003; King & Lenox, 2000; Barnett & King, 2008).
The motivation for firms to partake in the self-regulatory institution seems rather
obvious. First, self-regulation can invite opportunities for learning from best practices
and augment collective performance (Kraatz, 1998). It also provides an opportunity to
diffuse new norms or values as suitable for the industry, substituting for the normative
force of regulated institutions (King & Lenox, 2000). More importantly, participation in
self-regulatory institutions is a firm’s recognition that a firm’s reputation depends upon
more than just its own actions, and the actions of surrounding firms also shape a firm’s
reputation and ultimately its performance (Winn, MacDonald, & Zietsma, 2008). This
means that a firm’s poor behavior can taint the reputation of other firms in an industry.
On the other hand, one firm’s exemplary behavior can heighten expectations, leading to a
decline in the reputation of firms that do not keep pace (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008). Thus,
a change in the reputation of a firm is likely to influence the organization’s relationships
with its stakeholders, among which are peers in the same industry (Lange, Lee, & Dai,
2011). Researchers have called this the “reputation commons” problem (King, Lenox, &
Barnett, 2002; Tirole, 1996). While this is true for both positive and negative reputation,
it was found to be most salient under a negative reputation situation, or a reputation crisis
(Schneitz & Epstein, 2005).
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2.3. Sustainability
2.3.1. Definition
Firms operating in today’s business environment increasingly face complex
decision-making situations defined by a wide variety of demands from a diverse set of
stakeholders (Parmar et al., 2010; Bansal, 2005). The notion of corporate
sustainability has increasingly gained importance in recent years in both theory and
practice. While there still exists a lack of clarity on what constitutes corporate
sustainability and how to best achieve it, many studies have explored the definition and
constituents of corporate sustainability. Most widely used as the foundational definition
for sustainability, United Nations defined sustainability broadly as “meet[ing] the needs
of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their needs” (WCED, 1987: 43), and encompasses the achievement of three
interdependent dimensions, an economic, an environmental and a social one (Meadows,
1972; WCED, 1987).
As research on sustainability amassed in the management literature, there was
overall agreement that firms need to address interconnected and interdependent
economic, environmental and social concerns at different levels (Bansal, 2002). At the
same time, corporate sustainability literature has evolved by focusing more on the impact
of environmental and social issues on financial performance. Scholars have called this an
instrumental logic of sustainability where firms can benefit financially when they address
environmental or societal concerns (Dentchev, 2004; Husted & de Jesus Salazar, 2006).
These views of treating the environmental and social dimensions merely as means to
achieve financial performance have invited researchers to posit a more integrative view
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on corporate sustainability (Berger et al. 2007; Gao & Bansal 2013; Hahn et al. 2010;
Kleine & Hauff, 2009). This integrative view argues that firms need to pursue different
sustainability aspects in all three dimensions simultaneously, without forgoing one for the
other or utilizing one or two aspects as a pathway to achieving financial performance.
Three major research streams inform this perspective.
2.3.2 Stakeholder theory
The most prominent perspective around firms pursuing simultaneous goals is
stakeholder theory. The grounding of the theory is on the premise that firms all have
stakeholders and they should actively pay attention to them, and thereby create value over
time for a broad group of stakeholders than just shareholders (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et
al., 2004; 2010). Hence, this theoretical stream provided an alternative to a shareholderfocused performance orientation in the management field (Laplume et al., 2008;
Freeman, 1994). As it gained prominence in the fields in management including strategy,
business ethics, and organizational theory, the theory naturally seeped into the
sustainability literature more recently (Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Steurer, Langer,
Konrad, & Martinuzzi, 2005). The broad range of stakeholders, who are “any group or
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s
objectives” (Freeman, 1984: 46) implies that members of the community or the natural
environment also hold active stakes in affecting the organization. The increasingly broad
inclusion of who qualifies as a stakeholder gave rise to the expansion of indirect
stakeholders that may even marginally impact the firm. Stakeholders that hold prominent
power over firms (Frooman, 1999; Pajunen, 2006) or take on risk (Clarkson, 1995; Cragg
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& Greenbaum, 2002) were expanded to include those without direct power over the firm
(Argandona, 1998; Phillips, 1997a; Phillips et al., 2003; Reed, 1999).
From the review of stakeholder theory by Laplume and colleagues (2008), articles
that defined stakeholders were for the most part expansive, with 10 being highly
restrictive whereas 94 were broad. Also, 31 articles focused exclusively on marginalized
stakeholders. This definitional broadening continues for the next 8 years, as more
research on stakeholders bourgeoned since 2008, with the definition of stakeholders
encompassing advocacy groups (Olsen, Sofka, & Grimpe, 2016), academic and
practitioners (Banks et al., 2016), internal and external stakeholders (Crilly, Zollo, &
Hansen, 2012), social movement activism (King, 2008), and many have aggregated
different types of political, social, and economic stakeholders (Dorobantu, Henisz, &
Nartey, 2015) and observed their synergistic behaviors (Tantalo & Priem, 2014). These
broad and flexible conception of stakeholders present a grounding for pursuing
sustainability as a collective rather than as a single entity, as the arguments of this
dissertation will propose henceforth.
2.3.3. Natural resource-based view
The second perspective that informs sustainability research is the natural
resource-based view. Proposed by Hart (1995), the natural resource-based view (NRBV)
builds on the fundamental arguments of the resource-based view (RBV) (e.g., Barney,
1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) but identifies the natural environment as missing from how the
internal and external resources are constrained for generating sustained competitive
advantage. Thus, it ignored the interaction between an organization and its natural
environment, which could detrimentally impact the ability of an organization to create a
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sustainable competitive advantage. The main argument is that when considering the
resources of a firm, one needs to considered the challenges associated with the natural
environment as it poses questions that will trigger a fundamental shift in the way we
understand human interactions, and hence organizational actions. Hart (1995) writes that
“over the next decade, businesses will be challenged to create new concepts of strategy,
and it seems likely that the basis for gaining competitive advantage in the coming years
will be rooted increasingly in a set of emerging capabilities…for the resource-based view
to remain relevant, its creators must embrace and internalize the tremendous challenge
created by the natural environment: Strategists and organizational theorists must begin to
grasp how environmentally oriented resources and capabilities can yield sustainable
sources of competitive advantage” (1995:8). The natural resource-based view supports
the view that the “natural environment” is not restricted to environmental concerns but
also involves focusing on economic and social concerns (Hart & Dowell, 2011).
Following Hart’s ideas, subsequent research uncovered whether indeed it pays to
be green with most work focused on the relationship between profit and pollution control
or the stock market reaction to disclosure of environmental liabilities (Berchicci & King,
2007). Further, researchers identified and examined the required capabilities in
sustainability related areas such as pollution prevention and product stewardship as
positively impacting the firm’s sustainable competitive advantage (King & Lenox, 2002)
and exploring how firms derive these sustainability related capabilities – antecedents to
environmental and social capabilities – such as stakeholder pressures and employees’
cognitive framing of environmental issues (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Walls et al., 2012;
Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Messick, & Bazerman, 2000). Hence, the fundamental idea
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of the theory posits broader collaboration and system redesign, and suggests that
capabilities extend beyond the firm to include collaboration among the public and private
organizations needed to bring about substantial ecological, social, and technological
change that takes into account the “natural resources” in and out of the firm. This is a
crucial launch pad for understanding phenomena and theory regarding solving
sustainability related problems such as inter-organizational collaboration, reputation
commons, and creating coalitions, which will inform the findings of the dissertation.
2.3.4. Performance
The last perspective that informs the notion of sustainability for organizations has
to do with how we perceive of and measure performance. The accounting field has seen
the advent of the Triple Bottom Line (Elkington, 1997; Kleine & von Hauff, 2009),
which allows decision-makers to map economic, environmental and social issues side-byside and measure organizational performance across the range of aspects. Much work in
sustainability has observed the relationship between environmental, social performance
and financial performance, with both positive and negative effects consistently debated
among scholars (Orlitzky et al., 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2009). Most
research and discussion on organizational performance within the social sciences have
devoted to a study of the conditions under which organizations achieve different levels of
effectiveness (Price, 1972). Thus, performance has broadly been considered an outcome
of some sort of activities of the firm. However, there is also the view that performance
can be both an input and output especially in the theory of the organizational structure,
where it is examined how performance standards and their degree of achievement may
act as a stimulus to structural variation (Child, 1972). This can be interpreted that the
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cognitive perception of what performance is, or the performance standards, impact the
activities or strategies an organization pursues.
Sustainability by definition requires a different perspective about the traditional
view of performance and a firm must be able to view performance as surpassing just
financial performance (Hahn et al., 2014). It includes social and environmental
performance in addition to an economic one, thus a Triple Bottom Line, which has been
increasingly taken into consideration in understanding a firm’s overall performance
(Elkington, 1997). This view, which originally came from the accounting field, has
permeated into other areas of management since its inception. The core idea is that the
success or health of a corporation can and should be measured not only by the financial
bottom line but also by its social and environmental performance (Norman &
MacDonald, 2004). Since its introduction in the late 90’s, research has increasingly
explored the triple bottom line conception in sustainability reporting and disclosure and
found positive impacts of disclosing environmental and social practices on financial
performance (Milne & Gray, 2013). Studies also found different ways of extending the
triple bottom line conception to include a balanced scorecard or a consolidated
sustainable performance index (e.g. Hubbard, 2009). These attempts are important in
revealing the need to complicate the way in which we view firm performance, as they are
a function of multiple factors rather than a factor that can be singled out. Hence, this
incubates the idea that one needs to theorize differently about organizations achieving
these outcomes versus the ones that strive to achieve a restricted, confined, and narrow
view of performance.
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2.4. Institutional logics, self-regulatory institutions, and sustainability
The challenges associated with achieving sustainability for firms entails the
recognition and management of stakeholders, consideration of the natural environment
and the constraints it poses for a firm’s resources, and the expansion of performance
outcomes and goals to achieve that goes beyond financial performance. It is clear to see
from previous research that a firm pursuing sustainability, then, is susceptible to external
pressures and needs to build internal capability to push forth its efforts toward achieving
sustainability. However, at times, it is difficult for a firm to pursue such goals alone due
to the complexity of the external pressure and internal capabilities needed. Hence, firms
work with one another to pursue such outcomes as sustainability, and they often engage
in self-regulatory behavior and build self-regulated organizations that act as engines to
promote sustainability for the industry, which requires a collaborate effort to combine
disparate values and practices into a common one. Two theoretical perspectives further
inform these arguments.
2.4.1. Institutional strategy and institutional entrepreneurship
Institutional strategy refers to the patterns of actions that are concerned with
managing the institutional structures within which firms compete for resources
(Lawrence, 1999). While the processes by which organizations adopt institutionally
legitimated forms and practices have been examined extensively (e.g., Hinings &
Greenwood, 1988; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), relatively little attention has been paid to the
organizational work of sponsoring new practices or transforming existing institutions
(DiMaggio, 1991; Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991). Where the concept of strategy has been
connected to institutional processes, it has focused primarily on organizations' strategic
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responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991), rather than the way they bring about
those pressures. In contrast, this view examines institutional processes and structures
from the perspective of “those managers and organizations concerned with constructing
new institutions, and dismantling or transforming existing institutions” (Lawrence, 1999;
12). Hence, strategies must be developed (Lawrence, 1999) to embed change in fields
populated by diverse organizations, many of whom are invested in, committed to, and
advantaged by existing structural arrangements (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007).
Stemming from the institutional strategy ideas of Lawrence (1999), research on
institutional entrepreneurship further noted the importance agency of actors in shaping
institutional changes (Lawrence & Phillips, 2004). Institutional entrepreneurship refers to
activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who
leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones (Maguire,
Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; 657). Different norms or standards around what is right or
wrong stem from the actions of institutional entrepreneurs “where standards in the
making generate seeds of self-destruction” (Garud, Jain, Kumaraswamy, 2002: 2). As a
result of institutional entrepreneurship, new fields emerge (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence,
2004), or bring changes within existing mature institutional fields (Greenwood &
Suddaby, 2006). Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis (2011) argued that bridging institutional
entrepreneurs could help to create new organizational forms.
Theoretical perspective of institutional entrepreneurship is increasingly sought
after to explain sustainability-related phenomenon. The rise of the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI) is considered to be an act of institutional entrepreneurship in the
sustainability field to encourage the disclosure of sustainability practices (Brown, de
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Jong, & Lessidrenska, 2009). Wijen & Ansari (2007) explored how institutional
entrepreneurship often requires collective behavior, since change also needs cooperation
from numerous dispersed actors with divergent interests. By drawing on complementary
insights from institutional and regime theories, they identify drivers of collective
institutional entrepreneurship. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to
illustrate how collective inaction was overcome to realize a global regulatory institution,
the Kyoto Protocol. Based on the findings from these studies, the process of engaging in
collective behavior in building and initiating change in institutions is further explored in
the subsequent section.
2.4.2 Institutional logic hybridization
Research on institutional logics realize the existence of multiple logics in an
institutional space which are often incompatible or in conflict with each-other (cf.
Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Marquis & Lounsbury,
2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). To manage these disparate
logics within organizations, hybrid organizations emerge (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Battilana & Lee, 2014; Hoffman, Badiane, & Haigh, 2012). Hybrid organizations
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011) and
hybridizing practices (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Smets,
Morris, & Greenwood, 2012) have been studied to understand how organizations
integrate logics within their organization. However, less is known about the hybridization
of logics at the field level, although the hybridization of logics at the field level is crucial
in promoting field-level change and redefinition of norms and governance arrangements
(York, Hargarve, & Pacheco, 2016). Moreover, field-level logic hybridization may help
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to reconcile social welfare, environmental, and economic goals (Battilana, Lee, Walker,
& Dorsey, 2012).
Logic hybridization is especially a useful approach to understand the evolving of
a collective that intends to push a new form of guiding principles and practices into the
industry. The navigation of building cooperative relationships amongst rivalrous firms
while promoting an industry-wide mission is a difficult process (Cloutier & Barnett,
2016). When firms are working together they seek to build a new “rule of the game”
(North, 1990) that purposefully define the expected behaviors within the industry and
influence the institutional environment by doing so. These so-called new rules manifest
in the collective, but result from the deliberate effort to coalesce among the member
organizations that have distinctive values and practices, which are based on the
institutional logics instantiated in these organizations. Logic hybridization then serves as
a useful approach to explain the intricate process where the organizations and their
instantiation of certain institutional logics help to build a different set of logics for the
collective through hybridization.

2.5. Research questions
Building on the aforementioned theoretical foundations, this study seeks to trace
the emergence of a sustainability-promoting self-regulatory institution in the apparel
industry by observing the joining of a self-regulatory institution and focusing on the logic
hybridization process of the three founding firms of the self-regulatory institution. To do
this, this dissertation focuses on two research questions: 1) how does the threat and
opportunity perceptions around sustainability impact the joining of a coalition after a
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reputation crisis; and 2) for those firms that initiate a coalition, what is the process of
creating a hybridized logic for the collective? I argue that a negative industry crisis that
receives major public attention through the media, like the sweatshop crisis, will push
certain firms to engage in a collective, depending on how they perceive of sustainability.
In addition, unconventional partnership among the founding firms help undergo a process
of logic hybridization that results in the formation of a self-regulatory institution that
depends on the hybridized logic to guide its behavior. Then, the hybridized logic of the
self-regulatory institution manifests in its values and practices to instill itself as the
dominant logic for the coalition.
I conduct this utilizing a case study of the apparel industry to inquire the two
research questions, and conduct respective studies to answer them. The first research
question is how a reputation crisis in an industry impacts different ways of attending to
sustainability and encourage the joining of a collective. For this research question, a wide
period of 17 years (1998-2015) is studied to capture the overall impact of the sweatshop
crisis by including the time point when it surfaced and shifted the landscape around
sustainability among firms in the industry, leading up to the time frame during which
firms began to join the Sustainable Apparel Coalition. The second research question
zooms in on the founding firms and how they hybridized their disparate logics to build a
logic for the coalition. For this, a specific time frame was considered during which the
founding firms did the groundwork for building the Sustainable Apparel Coalition.
Hence, the five years (2005-2010) leading up to the creation of the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition is studied for the second research question. The year 2005 was chosen as the
first year for this period because of the first mention of sustainability in the apparel
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industry’s S&P Industry Survey Report, and it was when the first initial conversations
started to emerge among the founding firms of the Coalition.
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CHAPTER 3
SUSTAINABILITY CRISIS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

3.1. The apparel industry and the sweatshop crisis
The apparel industry in the U.S. inherently embodies many sustainability
challenges. In the late 80’s and early 90’s, firms in the apparel industry have increasingly
been relying on international sourcing as a way to lower costs and survive in the global
competition (Monczka & Trent, 1991). By the mid-90’s, United States is the world’s
largest importer of garments, importing apparel products from over 150 countries, many
of which were developing countries. The growth in sourcing apparel abroad had been
increasing steadily by 171 percent between 1985 and 1995 amounting to $35 billion
(Emmelheinz & Adams, 1999). By 2001, about two thirds of apparel worn by Americans
was produced outside the United States (D’Innocenzio, 2001), and more recent estimates
of U.S. apparel import penetration place it at about 75% by wholesale dollar value and
96% by number of garments (American Apparel & Footwear Association [AAFA],
2002).
The globalization of the industry incurred poor labor conditions of workers in
overseas factories manifesting without significant oversight by the firms in U.S.
headquarter. Due to the abrupt growth in expansion, these factories were operating in
almost total absence of government regulation or union work rules (Goldman & Papson,
1998; Manheim, 2001). Labor issues from these factories have been escalating
incrementally leading to the initial “sweatshop crisis” in 1996 when a National Labor
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Committee exposé revealed that a clothing line at Wal-Mart was made using child labor
in Honduran sweatshops (DeWinter, 2001).
The scandal heightened soon after in 1997, Nike was accused of similar
conditions in their Southeast Asian factories stirring much public attention. In 1998, then
CEO Philip Knight responded to monitor and script self-supervised codes of conduct to
regulate working conditions with their subcontractors. Since then, the apparel industry
has faced scrutiny from media and consumers, and stirred a need to remedy the problem
at the industry level. One of the efforts constituted the creation of the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition, a multi-stakeholder self-regulatory institution, and development of the Higg
Index, a tool to measure the sustainability of the organization’s operations in every step
of the supply chain.
Institutional change is often initiated by an exogenous shock bringing critical
junctures that disrupt the status quo and trigger fundamental institutional changes
(Haydu, 1998; Thelen, 1999). The “sweatshop crisis” that occurred in the late 90’s in the
apparel industry can be categorized as a one of these critical junctures. It also is “a threat
to the reputation and a disruption in the overall image stakeholders hold about an
organization, which effects are revealed in the withdrawal of reputational capital”
(Coombs, 2007). To better understand the magnitude of this event and context, I track the
public attention by media to the event as it signals the salience of the event (Nigam &
Ocasio, 2010).
Figure 1 shows the amount of media coverage on sweatshop conditions of Nike
starting in 1996 to 2005 when media coverage became minimal on the topic. Figure 2
shows the amount of coverage on sustainability globally and in the U.S. Sustainability in
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the apparel industry was practically non-existent in the media until the 1998 – 2001
period, from when coverage soared continuously, both globally and in the U.S. The
establishment of the Sustainable Apparel Coalition in 2010 is the first industry-wide
effort to tackle sustainability issues directly and explicitly.
This connotes a number of aspects about the institutional environment of the
apparel industry that speaks to the institutional logics perspective. First, institutional
logics of the apparel industry were relatively stable and sustainability was non-existent
until a critical juncture, such as the sweatshop crisis, inflicted an alteration of logics in
the industry. “Re-definition of what the most important things are” is an important
precursor to change in institutional logics. Second, organizations acted differently
reacting to the crisis. According to the institutional logics perspective, organizational
fields are made up of a variety of organizations that have their values anchored in
different societal-level institutional orders (Thornton et al., 2012). The focus on “why
organizations are different, why they compete or cooperate, and why they may strive to
maintain their autonomy and distinctiveness” (Thorton et al., 2012) enables one to study
the industry in a more fine-grained way to understand the differences between firms that
reacted or did not react in a certain way.
Relatedly, reputation scholars have referred to the “reputation commons” problem
(King, Lenox, Barnett, 2002), emphasizing that a firm’s reputation is not a problem of its
own. That is, a firm’s reputation depends upon more than just its own actions, and the
actions of surrounding firms also shape a firm’s reputation and ultimately its performance
(Winn et al., 2008). In particular, an organization’s actions may change the perceptions
toward the industry, and industry perceptions can shape the evaluation of a firm in that
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industry (cf. Barnett & King, 2008; Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; Winn et al., 2008; Rao,
1994).
3.2. Attention to sustainability
As the consequence of the negative crisis on reputation, firms need to focus the
attention of actors on particular features of organizations and their environment, as well
as shape different selections of strategies. Pressures arise from the media, consumers, and
social activist groups, and as the spillover from the crisis becomes evident, firms feel the
need to solve the problems due to a crisis situation, and firms’ attention will shift
accordingly. From this point onward, however, it is dependent on the individual firms to
attend to and reflect on the crisis situation. Organizations interpret these pressures and
come up with responses that are in line with the interests of the institutional
constituencies, as firms have pre-existing models and language within its individual
functions and competencies with which to conceptualize and formulate a response to
environmental pressures (Hoffman, 2001). Institutional logics are activated based on the
individual’s knowledge and prior experience to the salient aspects of the environmental
situation (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).
From a decision-maker’s cognitive point of view, researchers note that a crucial
component of managerial behavior in rapidly changing environments is problem sensing,
the cognitive processes of noticing and constructing meaning about environmental
change so that organizations can take action (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Barr, Stimpert, &
Huff, 1992; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Inherent in managerial attention is the
interpretation of the environment and the acknowledgement that it is context specific
(Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Kaplan, 2008). Thus, it will be in the individual firm’s decision-
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maker’s interests to shift attention to the areas that the changing institutional logics
indicate as the dominant logic. However, when and how firms attend to the logic is
dependent on how firms perceive of this logic.
Following a crisis like the sweatshop crisis, firms often are faced with a threat and
an opportunity simultaneously (Kovoor-Misra, 2009). Threats and opportunities are two
constructs used to categorize environmental events that have been found to be salient in
executive decision-making (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Threat and opportunity are
perceived differently, with threat perceived as negative with a potential for loss over gain,
while an opportunity situation is often positive with more gain than loss (Jackson &
Dutton, 1988). A crisis situation poses both at the same time and allows the firm a choice.
A threat situation generally brings a threat rigidity response, narrowing the information
processing, requiring quick action, adherence to past expectations, and an attention to
dominant cues (Xie & Wang, 2003).
3.3. Hypotheses
Based on these ideas, those firms who frame sustainability as a threat after the
crisis will be more likely to be quick to form a plan to deal with the situation with the
dominant logic pervading earlier on to guide behavior. In addition, as a way to mitigate
the threat, firms search for ways to spread out the consequences of the potential threat
rather than bearing the burden on its own. Self-regulatory institutions provide an
opportunity for firms to obtain the insurance against claims of negligence (King &
Lenox, 2000) when confronted with threats. By conforming the firms into a collective
entity, firms are able to use the membership in the self-regulatory institution as a signal of
following the commonly accepted practice in the industry (Neeson, 1996). An illustrative
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excerpt from the annual report of a firm in 1998 articulates this threat rigidity response
responding to poor performance following the sweatshop crisis. This firm had to perform
audits regarding sweatshop issues in 1997, one by Ernst & Young and the other by
former U.N. ambassador and civil rights leader Andrew Young. They both proved to be
public relations embarrassments (Pollach, 2003).
…We (and the entire industry) tend to be a bit misunderstood. The media prefer to
treat us all as the entertainment portion of the business world. So, they feel free to
exaggerate, to interpret, to extrapolate. To say they are prone to hyperbole would
be an understatement. To say that is how they make their living would not…The
financial community has made great strides in the past few years in understanding
this industry. Even so, without complete understanding of where we know we can
go, they still get a little nervous about us based on their perceptions of the future.
Perceptions are important, but they make a poor substitute for insight…
Because of the threat perceiving attitude of this firm, evidences of attempting to
engage in collective behavior shortly begins for this firm, as well as quickly revamping
internal operations to deal with the crisis. Near the end of the decade, the firm backed the
creation of the Fair Labor Association (1998) and, second, the Global Alliance (1999).
These two groups were intended to improve conditions in Asian apparel factories through
industry developed codes, self-monitoring supplemented by audits conducted by local
NGOs, and voluntary instead of legal accountability (Pollach, 2003; Post et al., 2002). Of
more significant long-term consequence is the fact that they took the initiative to create a
Division of Corporate Responsibility that regularly engages journalists, activists, union
officials, and NGO representatives (Hollander & Fenichell, 2004; Post et al., 2002). It
also created a special purpose website intended to reposition the company in relation to
the emotionally charged sweatshop controversy and related human rights abuse
allegations and, thereby, strengthen the company’s claim to being a socially responsible
corporation (Waller & Conaway, 2011).
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On the other hand, firms that view sustainability as an opportunity to gain
competitive advantage will show different behaviors in joining the self-regulatory
institution. There is also autonomy and choice to act in these opportunity situations,
strategies to resolve these situations are present, resolution is likely, and perceivers are
more likely to feel qualified to respond (Kovoor-Misra, 2009). Opportunity conditions
may expand the scope of perceptions, enabling firms to evaluate various alternatives and
take more risks (Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000). Firms that sense an opportunity in
sustainability will therefore take more time to evaluate alternatives and work internally to
correct failures or organizational dysfunctions that may have led to the crisis in the first
place. They may exhibit caution to risky behavior and do not immediately follow the
movement in the industry, but instead wait to “see what happens.” These firms may join
the coalition when they have collected sufficient information about sustainability and
they find a source of competitive advantage. They are therefore more likely to join the
self-regulatory institution when decision makers perceive a sense of mastery and control
over the domain in question than when there is an absence of such perceptions (cf.
George et al., 2006). The following illustrates a news article that portrays an opportunityperceiving firm that sees the positive and advantageous aspects to addressing the
sweatshop issue transparently. It also speaks to the absence of engaging in collective
behavior just yet, but instead improving the internal activities of the organization.
It is historic. No other company has produced this type of information about their
production," said executive director of Sweatshop Watch, a garment-worker
advocacy group in Oakland. "It's really a door-opening (move) toward more
disclosure about labor practices."……."I do want to credit (company name)," he
said. "Even though (company name) realizes there are some risks (of added
scrutiny), they believe it's outweighed by the positive aspects of being transparent.
(Media Interview, 2005)
To further explicate the distinction between threat attention and opportunity
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attention, I focus on the founding firms of a self-regulatory institution in the apparel
industry to find out whether they attend to sustainability as a threat or opportunity. Table
2 shows the amount of words related to opportunity and threat included in the three
founding firms’ annual reports over time. As expected, threat attention is more dominant
among the three founding firms as they respond and react to the sweatshop crisis. This
helps to theorize about how different responses of firms to the crisis are a precursor to the
creation of the self-regulatory institution. The inflicted industry due to the reputation
crisis consists of firms that show disparate responses to the crisis, whether it be a threat or
opportunity perception of sustainability, and these different firm reactions lay the
cornerstones for identifying the firms who choose to engage in collective behavior to
solve the industry’s concerns. Based on these findings, I test the following hypothesis to
understand the timing of joining in a coalition.
Hypothesis 1: Following a crisis, firms that perceive sustainability as a threat are
more likely to attend to it immediately and participate early in a self-regulatory
institution.

Hypothesis 2: Following a crisis, firms that perceive sustainability as an
opportunity are more likely to attend to the logic later than threat-perceiving
firms and to participate later in self-regulatory behavior.

In addition to perceiving sustainability as a threat or an opportunity, other factors
also contribute to the timing of attending to the logic and participation in self-regulatory
institutions. Often, a decrease in reputation negatively impacts financial performance of
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the whole industry (Barnett & King, 2008). Firms that are not performing well financially
will be at more risk to associate themselves with a collective downward industry
performance. Also, lower performing firms will also be more risk averse to wait until
other peers have joined and may participate as a laggard. Moreover, research shows that
visible companies are scrutinized by stakeholders more often than the ones that are not
and invite more social pressure (Getz, 1997). Visible firms are also held to higher
standards and benefit more from isomorphism (Deephouse, 1996). Partaking or taking the
lead in joining the self-regulatory institution enables the firm to signal their efforts in
response to the sustainability pressures and provide an opportunity to portray the firm’s
positive actions.
Hypothesis 3: Lower performing firms are more likely to participate later in a
self-regulatory institution following a crisis.

Hypothesis 4: Firms with higher visible brand or corporate names are more likely
to create or participate early in a self-regulatory institution following a crisis.

3.4. Methodology
The apparel industry suffered a major crisis that received a great degree of public
attention, and the industry has created a self-regulatory institution following a crisis, as
the sweatshop crisis in 1996-1997 was a major crisis and the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition as a self-regulatory institution was formed in 2011. The time period of interest
is 17 years from 1998-2015, and the sample consists of 189 firms in the Sustainable
Apparel Coalition, including brands, manufacturers, and retail firms. The total sample

35

consists of 189 firms, resulting in 3,213 firm-years.
Given the theoretical interests above around threat and opportunity attention, I use
a survival analysis (event history methods) to test the hypotheses. This method is
appropriate as I am interested in an event, “Participation in the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition,” and this concern with events is tied to an interest in the history preceding the
event. Used widely in the social sciences, survival analysis recognizes that history
involves timing and for many research questions the timing of social change is at least as
interesting as understanding the event culminating the history itself (Box-Steffensmeier
& Jones, 2004).
More specifically, this paper uses the Cox Proportional Hazards Model (Cox,
1972; 1975) to account for the distributional form of the duration time to be left
unspecified, but still retrieving the baseline hazard and baseline survivor functions. This
is an adequate method in that not all firms in the apparel and footwear industry have
joined the Sustainable Apparel Coalition as of 2016, and the research questions of interest
are less concerned with the notion of time dependency, but more the relationship between
the outcome (dependent variable) and the covariates of theoretical interest. As such, the
Cox model informs the degree to which the different variables in the data predicts the
outcome.
3.4.1. Measures
The dependent variable is the event, membership in the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition, marked by the month and year in which the firm joins the coalition. This spans
from May 2009 to September 2016, which shows a peak in membership between June
2012 to January 2014, and shows a normal distribution.
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3.4.1.1. Independent variables
3.4.1.1.1. Threat and opportunity attention
In order to understand how firms pay attention to sustainability, annual reports of the 87
public firms out of 189 members of the SAC were collected for the 17 years, yielding
1,479 annual reports. The A content analysis of the shareholder letters component of the
annual reports is often used to assess where the management team’s attention lies (Cho &
Hambrick, 2006). These letters are public statements made by chief executives charged
with projecting their companies’ futures. They are official documents that discuss the
strategic themes that top managers believe are important to the firm (Osborne et al.,
2001). Although the letters to shareholders cannot fully incorporate all the beliefs that are
held by the top managers, these documentary sources represent the beliefs that could be
unconsciously held by top managers and are supported by the organization (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). The documents were manually coded for in sections on sustainability in
the letters to shareholders, counting the frequencies of threat or opportunity connotations,
and considering the threat and opportunity related words as identified in prior studies
(Kovoor-Misra, 2009; Zhou et al., 2008). For example, threat perceptions of
sustainability refer to the frequency of negative wording such as ‘concerned,’ ‘risk,’
‘challenges,’ ‘worried,’ or reactive action items such as ‘monitor,’ ‘mitigate,’ ‘minimize,’
‘yield.’ Opportunity perceptions refer to the frequency of wording such as ‘hopeful,’
‘opportunity,’ ‘competitive,’ ‘advantage,’ ‘alternatives,’ ‘excited,’ or proactive action
items such as ‘overcome,’ ‘lead,’ ‘change,’ ‘transform.’
3.4.1.1.2. Financial performance.
The longitudinal performance of the 187 firms over the 17 years of interest is
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collected through COMPUSTAT, including EBIT, ROA, and ROE.
3.4.1.1.3. Visibility.
I follow the measure of visibility used in King & Lenox (2000) to administer a
survey to 76 senior business school students to indicate if they recognized a company’s
name or knew any of its brands. Visibility is the percentage of respondents that
recognized the company out of the total number of respondents, and is a number between
0 and 1, where 1 signifies that all respondents recognized the company or the brand.
3.4.2. Estimation
To estimate the Cox Model of the research question, the following hazard rate can
be estimated regarding two hazards of threat attention and opportunity attention where
ℎ" ($) refers to the baseline hazard function and &′( are the covariates and regression
parameters:
ℎ) ($)
= exp (& / (012340 + (67762089)0: + (;)949<)4= 732;62>49<3 + (?)@)A)=)0: + ⋯ )
ℎ" ($)
The hazard rate of other variables financial performance and visibility can be estimated
as the following respectively:
ℎ) $ = ℎ" $ exp(& / (;)949<)4= 732;62>49<3 )
ℎ) $ = ℎ" $ exp(& / (?)@)A)=)0: )

3.5. Results
The descriptive statistics of the data is in Table 3. The correlations are all below
.6, with the exception of the correlations between opportunity perception and high
performance (r = 0.877). In that such a correlation could potentially bias the estimates
and standard errors, I examined the possibility of collinearity problems by looking at
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variance inflation factors (VIFs). The VIFs were estimated using OLS regression and
found that the mean VIF was 3.22 and the highest VIF was 7.18. This is below the
common cut value of 10 and thus suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue in these
analyses (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006).
The results of the Cox Model event history analysis are elaborated in Table 4.
The Cox model uses the same data and the covariate values for each subject to fit a
survival curve that is obtained by estimating regression parameters using what Cox called
the partial likelihood function. The measure of effect is the hazard rate, which is the risk
of failure (i.e., the risk or probability of suffering the event of interest), given that the
participant has “survived” up to a specific time. The results suggest that the threat
perception of firms have a significant and higher hazard rate (the probability of joining
the coalition) than the opportunity perceiving firms, which show positive but nonsignificant results towards predicting the event of joining the coalition. As such,
Hypothesis 1 is supported, but Hypothesis 2 is not supported. In addition, the
performance and visibility hypotheses (H3 and H4) are not supported, and do not show
any significance in predicting the hazard rate.
The significant result for H1 supports lends credence to the relationship between
threat perception of sustainability and engaging in collective behavior. Specifically, this
finding suggests that the way firms translate sustainability from the reputation crisis –
threat or opportunity – impacts the active participation in self-regulatory institutions.
Prior work has noted that contested industries such as mining, oil or gas, and chemicals
often are investing vast amounts of resources and effort in collaboration and collective
development due to the risk factor involved in these industries, and the relative danger to
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the industry reputation (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008). As such, the more possible negativity
the firm sees in sustainability, the more likely it will be inclined to join a coalition to
promote industry-level practices for sustainability instead of relying solely on firm-level
actions. This is consistent with the findings from this study and extends previous studies
in that even in relatively less contested industries such as apparel and textiles, a
perception of threat due to a reputation crisis experience triggers a similar response in
exuding the motivation to engage in collective action.
I find a number of possible explanations for the non-significant results for H2,
H3, and H4. First, opportunity recognition from negative situations and its influence on
collective behavior is a less understood phenomenon (Patzelt & Shepherd, 2011). Withinindustry companies navigate between competitive and collaborative practices at the
industry-level (Rumelt, 1991), but it is more challenging to tease out the source of
competitive advantage in collaboration itself, as firm-level and industry-level impacts
have been traditionally separated out to understand competitive advantage (Porter, 1991).
Work on inter-organizational collaboration (Philips, Lawrence, and Hardy, 2000; Powell,
1990) help to merge and connect the industry and firm level influence on collaboration,
but further research is needed to seek this working balance between competitive and
cooperative tensions (Barnett, 2006) to fully understand the relationship between the
opportunity-seeking firms and collaborative behavior such as joining of collectives.
Hypothesis 3 posited that higher performing firms would be more likely to see the
benefit in joining in collectives than the lower performing firms. This hypothesis was not
supported with neither high performance or low performance having significant influence
on the event (joining the coalition). This is contrary to my expectations as I failed to find
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any influence of performance on collective behavior. This may suggest that financial
performance is not indicative of actions such as actively engaging in collective behavior.
Hypothesis 4 was also not supported, and high or low visibility did not impact the joining
of a coalition. These insignificant results for H3 and H4 could also be that the
performance and visibility of firms are somewhat confounded with the overall reputation
of the firm, and could be teased out further if reputation was measured directly instead of
performance or visibility. Research indicates, for instance, that overall reputation and
superior financial performance are closely linked (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Visibility
is often an indicator of reputation or a component when measuring corporate reputation
(Schwaiger, 2004; Wartick, 2002). However, reputation is also prone to spillover among
firms in the same industry (cf. Yu & Lester, 2008), and could be difficult to obtain an
accurate measure of firm-level reputation especially after a negative reputation crisis.

3.6. Discussion
The findings from this study has a number of implications for the overall
dissertation, and also specifically to the subsequent study. First, it speaks to the
significance of different ways of attending to sustainability. Attention-based view
(Ocasio, 1997; 2011) indicates the importance of cognitive perceptions and
interpretations in the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and effort on
both (a) issues: the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the environment
and (b) answers: the available repertoire of action alternatives (Ocasio, 1997).
Especially a reputation crisis primes the immediate reaction towards both the issue
(sustainability) at hand and solutions to address the issue. The significance of threat
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attention, as observed in this study, builds on previous findings in the reputation literature
that negative reputation drives fear and threat-induced reactions from firms (e.g. Dean,
2004; Tucker & Melewar, 2005). While opportunity attention is found insignificant in
joining collectives from this study’s findings, it may have significant implications when
predicting other organizational outcomes such as entrepreneurial opportunity and access
to resources and creativity (Renko, Shrader, & Simon, 2012; Zhou, Shin, & Cannella,
2008).
Second, the insignificance of performance or visibility signals the complexity of
reputational components in predicting organizational behavior. While financial
performance and visibility is often associated to be a component of reputation that is
indicative of engaging in self-regulatory behavior (King & Lenox, 2000; Ostrom, 1998),
this study proposes that other explanations exist, such as threat attention. Following a
reputational issue, how a firm pays attention to an issue may be a more powerful source
of motivation for firms to engage in collective action, than the reputation marked by low
or high performance, or low or high visibility. This adds to the complex nature of
reputation and suggests teasing out the different components of reputation to include
framing or cognitive perceptions that are frequently called for when engaging in research
regarding non-financial performance such as reputation or sustainability (Hahn, Preuss,
Pinkse, & Figge, 2014).
With findings indicating that there are disparate behaviors in joining a selfregulatory institution even within an industry, the implication of this study extends to the
subsequent study (Study 2) that hones in on the founding members of the self-regulatory
institution, as they are the most proactive members in the coalition. While threat attention
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is found to impact the joining of a coalition, it still leaves a question about why some
firms start such collectives, and how they overcome the obstacles of working together to
achieve collective outcomes. Hence, this study provides an exploratory foresight into
studying the founding firms in more depth.
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CHAPTER 4
LOGIC HYBRIDIZATION PROCESSES OF FOUNDING FIRMS

The previous exploratory study on participation in the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition provides numerous insights that calls for a further understanding of the
founding members of this collective – Patagonia, Walmart, and Nike. While attending to
sustainability as a threat influenced the early participation in the Coalition, a more finegrained account of the most proactive members of the Coalition is needed to fully
understand the origins and evolving of the Coalition over time. To this end, this study
focuses on the founding members of the Coalition and the salience of certain institutional
logics that are embedded in these organizations to uncover a process of logic
hybridization that provides a foundation for developing a new institutional logic for the
apparel industry.

4.1. Setting
To conduct this research, I used a theoretical sampling approach (Eisenhardt &
Graebner, 2007; Glaser & Straus, 1967), which selects a case based on its suitability for
explaining the different constructs of interest and the relationships between them. As a
result, the apparel industry was chosen as the field of interest, and the Sustainable
Apparel Coalition and its founding organizations were chosen as the organizations of
interest. The apparel industry is particularly well suited for this study’s research question.
First, the apparel industry inherently involves activities that incur sustainability threats
that resulted in an industry-wide crisis. Second, the apparel industry has a voluntary self-

44

regulatory institution that differentiates itself from the trade associations or other forms of
collective action in that it not only seeks the assimilation of values around sustainability,
but also practices. The Sustainable Apparel Coalition incorporates the development of the
Higg Index as a core practice, which is critical to building an institutional logic (Thornton
et al., 2012). Third, the three firms that initiated collective action to create the
fundamental basis for the self-regulatory institution had a completely different
instantiation of institutional logics that were more salient than others, which had to be
combined or merged in some way or another over time to create a coherent set of
institutional logics guiding the self-regulatory institution, acting as an engine for
institutional change in the apparel industry. Hence, the fit between the research question
and the setting provides an opportunity for keenly observing the phenomenon of interest.
The Sustainable Apparel Coalition is a self-regulatory institution based on
voluntary membership that was founded in 2009 by three organizations – Patagonia,
Walmart, and Nike. After its initiation, the membership has increased to 189
organizations as of 2016, and is approximately one third of the apparel industry in market
size (Sustainable Apparel Coalition Annual Report, 2015). The organization is operated
under a top management team of the Coalition, which is separate from the member firms
and does not include any staff of the member organizations. For instance, the CEO of the
Coalition was hired externally based on his experience in sustainability-related functions
in organizations including public, private, and non-profit organizations (Kibbey, 2016).
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4.2. Data Collection and Methodological Frameworks
Previous work on institutional logic change has noted that it is difficult to
measure institutional logics directly (Thorton & Ocasio, 1999). Rather, researchers have
used a mix of qualitative interview data and a content analysis of various reports ranging
from annual reports of the industry, relevant journals, and media reports (Dunn & Jones,
2010; Orlitzky, 2011). I follow this approach. Table 1 outlines the data sources for this
study and the usage of each data source in the paper. Mainly used were archival data
collected from multiple sources, which provided an abundance of materials for multiple
iterations of open coding, both on industry-level and organizational-level. This is in line
with the theoretical foundations of institutional logics, where the field-level logics and
the principle and practices that manifest inside organizations are distinctive (Thorton et
al., 2012; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Dalpiaz et al., 2016).
4.2.1. Archival data.
The majority of the data used consisted of archival data at different levels –
industry, organization, and individual. At the industry level, I collected 1,209 newspaper
articles for 2005-2015 obtained from Lexis Nexis using the database’s filter for industry
(apparel and fashion industry) and the embedded keywords in the database,
“sustainability,” “sustainable,” “sustainable development,” “sustainable investing.” This
included both U.S. and global media accounts for the apparel and fashion industry. In
addition to the media reports, I collected the annual industry survey reports published by
the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database to complement the understanding of the
industry. At the organizational level, I obtained the annual reports for the two public
companies, Walmart and Nike, and media interviews and articles for the three
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organizations. The number of articles range from 10 to 76 per year for the respective
organizations. In addition, I added two semi-biographical books for Patagonia and one
published book on Walmart. At the individual level, I utilized the books for Patagonia’s
founder, as well as media interviews of CEOs for all three organizations. Two video
interview clips of the CEO of Nike (Mark Parker) and Patagonia (Yvon Chouinard) were
also used to complement the written media interviews.
4.2.2. Semi-structured interviews.
The interviews were conducted during a three week period in August and
September, 2016. I conducted 8 interviews with 4 members of the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition, including 3 interviews with the CEO and 5 interviews with other staff
members of the organization. The interviews lasted 20 minutes to 60 minutes. The initial
interview protocol was unstructured to gain an understanding of the organization in
general and build rapport. Subsequent interviews were based on a set of questions
constructed based on the initial understanding of the three founding organizations and the
Coalition. The interview protocol used is attached in Appendix 5. Interviews were
conducted in person, recorded, and transcribed, resulting in 109 pages of single-spaced
text.
4.2.3. Analysis
For the case study, the collected data was constantly compared and contrasted
throughout the process of analysis. At the organizational level of the founding firms,
three categories were coded for: (1) The principles that the organization identified as
guiding their action, (2) the changes in practices, and (3) the outcomes achieved (Dalpiaz
et al., 2016). As themes emerged from the data, I moved between the data and literature
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on self-regulatory institutions, institutional logics, and sustainability to engage in an
iterative process of understanding the findings based on the evidence emerging from the
data.
A first-order coding of all materials were done, and reiterative processes of
alternating between data and literature repeated until key theories, events, and codes were
generated (Gioia et al., 2013). When the first order codes were generated for the three
categories in identifying the specificities of the institutional logics of founding firms and
the self-regulatory institution, I grouped them to generate second-order codes that
pertained to symbols/values and structure/practices components of institutional logics.
The result of the first-order and second-order coding and the evidence from the data is
presented in Table 5. The descriptive accounts of these themes will be discussed in the
findings section below.

4.3. Findings
According to the S&P Industry Survey in 2005, for consumer product companies
in particular, “the relationship between good corporate governance and corporate social
responsibility (CSR) are intertwined: accusations of sweatshops and child labor have
resulted in consumer boycotts and loss of brand equity, along with a decline in share
price. Therefore, we see the best corporate governance efforts including supply chain
alignment with CSR in order to avoid guilt by association.” This is the first time any of
the sweatshop issue was mentioned by Standard & Poor’s industry surveys. It also marks
the year on which Nike first addressed sustainability issues in its annual report. Selfregulatory institutions such as the Sustainable Apparel Coalition came into existence
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from a few firms – Patagonia, Walmart, and Nike – that started planting the seeds for it
since then.
To understand the salient institutional logic(s) that these three organizations
instantiate, I first assess the components of logics – values or symbols, and practices or
structures – and evidence of them in the archival data, as elaborated in Table 7. Based on
these, I compare the community and corporate logics in Table 6, and then generate the
ideal-typical institutional logics of the three founding firms of the Coalition in Table 7 to
understand the institutional logics embedded in these organizations. The institutional
logics that are instantiated in the three founding firms are a variant of the community
logic, as well as two different variants of the corporation logic, identified in Thornton et
al. (2012). A comparison of the two ideal-typical institutional logics used for this study –
community logics and corporation logics – are indicated in Table 6.

4.3.1. Pro-environmental community logic: Patagonia
Prior research identifies the main institutional orders to reside in markets,
corporations, the professions, the family, the religions, and the state (Thornton, 2004).
This has been later expanded to include community logics (Thornton et al., 2012). The
institutional logic that is most salient in Patagonia manifests through the values and
practices pertaining to a pro-environmental community logic. The community logic has
been studied to include factors such as identity, value, and tradition increase community
members’ commitments to a particular geographic community and the organizational
consequences of such traditions (e.g. Marquis & Battilana, 2009, Marquis et al., 2011).
The role of community logics has been expanded over time and community logics not
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only facilitate different kinds of organizational behavior but also enable different
orientations to move toward broader field-level logics (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015).
For Patagonia, a distinct community logic based in the California region guided
the creation of this organization. The founder Yvon Chouinard organically built his
knowledge in mountaineering as a young member of the local community in Ventura,
California. At 14, he started out as a climber in 1953 as part of the Southern California
Falconry Club, which trained hawks and falcons for hunting. Yvon and his friends
became more engaged in the sport and made trips to different points in the state from the
west end of the San Fernando Valley to the sandstone cliffs of Stoney Point. After he had
joined the climbing group called Sierra Club, it was a matter of time before Yvon started
to get interested in climbing equipment and began to make his own, starting with steel
pitons. The word spread and the climbing community in the region started buying
Chouinard's chrome-molybdenum steel pitons for $1.50 each. This was the first time he
engaged in a business transaction. (Chouinard, 2013; 2006).
Chouinard built a small shop in his parents' backyard in Burbank, and the
company was officially in operation under the name Patagonia in 1973, but Yvon has
been offering services to his friends and family for years before that under the name
Chouinard Equipment. But during this time, Yvon began forming the way he was going
to do business – the non-traditional, unconventional, independent way. The following
excerpt signals this motive.
One day it dawned on me that I was a businessman and would probably be one
for a long time. I would never be happy playing by the normal rules of business.
I wanted to distance myself as far as possible from those pasty-faced corpses in
suits I saw in airline magazine ads. If I had to be a businessman, I was going to
do it on my own terms.
- Media interview with Yvon Chouinard, 2011
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As Yvon accrued the foundations for what would become Patagonia, he had to go
through a number of instances where his values clashed with organizational outcomes.
Especially, when he had to lay off workers in 1991 due to failed projection in growth,
Yvon felt the need to deeply think about “the direction Patagonia should go.” (Chouinard,
2013). As growth surged and the company grew over the years, he constantly returned to
the mountains and valleys, visited old friends from the Southern California Falconry
Club, and tracked back to what he and his friends believed in. He notes that “(we) have
never had to make a break from the traditional corporate culture that makes businesses
hidebound and inhibits creativity. For the most part, we simply made the effort to hold to
our own values and traditions.”
With this in mind, the environmental issues in the Ventura region triggered a
motivation to engage deeply in solving sustainability problems. As noted in the in the
company’s public documents regarding the first interest in environmental engagement,
the following excerpt signals the impact of the community-based environmental issues
impacting the organization’s decision to frontier the efforts in sustainability.
The first lesson had come right here at home, in the early '70s. A group of us went
to a city council meeting to help protect a local surf break. We knew vaguely that
the Ventura River had once been a major steelhead salmon habitat…… At that
city council meeting, several experts testified that the river was dead…. The
community built the“Friends of the Ventura River”and worked to defeat them, to
clean up the water and to increase its flow. Wildlife increased and more steelhead
began to spawn….taught us two important lessons: that a grassroots effort could
make a difference, and that degraded habitat could, with effort, be restored…..We
began to make regular donations, to stick to smaller groups working to save or
restore habitat rather than give the money to NGOs with big staffs, overheads,
and corporate connections. (Company history)
After this initial engagement, Patagonia grew even further in size and strcuture,
but still kept the essence of learning from the community about environmental and social
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issues and supporting social movements and grassroots efforts that contribute to solving
these issues that need to be addressed to combat wider environmental issues such as
climate change at a global scale, as the following quote suggests.
…activities that influence the larger corporate community to also adjust its values
and behavior, and that support, through activism and financially, grassroots and
national campaigners who work to solve the current environmental and social
crisis.
(Autobiography of Yvon Chouinard, 2013)
Hence, the pro-environmental community logic for the apparel industry is a logic
that Patagonia embodies and prioritizes as a way to disseminate its values and beliefs to
the broader industry to shape the industry and the institutional environment. This adds to
the argument that community logics may act as a filter to cause indirect effects in
organizational reactions to broader field-level institutional logics, and can amplify or
dampen the influence of broader field-level logics (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015).

4.3.2. Corporation (multi-industry and industry-specific) logic
The corporation logic refers to a set of values and practices associated with an
incorporated entity. A corporation is an institution and a governance system, and in
particular, an institutional innovation with its origins traced to the shift from personal to
corporate rights, based on the legal institutional system (Coleman, 1974; 1990). It has
given rise to a wide range of economic activity because of its distinct advantages, such as
capital assimilation, ability to engage in contracts, and limited liability for shareholders
(Williamson, 1975). Table 6 outlines the main differences in the ideal-types of a
community logic and a corporate logic. Corporation (or corporate) logics is dominant for
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organizations that adopt activities in order to enhance the goals of a corporation, even if
they have elements of social welfare or sustainability. For example, corporations
implement social responsibility initiatives as a means of enhancing profits (Porter &
Kramer, 2006), and “base of the pyramid” organizations that primarily embody a market
logic incorporate elements of a development logic as they seek to create profitable
products for the world’s poorest (Kistruck, Sutter, Lount, & Smith, 2013).
For Walmart and Nike, the corporate logic manifests in both firms but is instilled
differently depending on the different industries they operate in. This causes disparate
instantiations of the corporate logic with the different corporate structures and networks
that the firm needs to pursue its economic activity and meet the needs of the shareholders.
The multi-industry retail chain, Walmart, embodies the diverse elements of the industries
that the firm works in and achieving significant market position and gaining the corporate
reputation and growth in size and market share through exploiting these networks are
illustrated in the below quote in the annual report of the firm.
At Wal-Mart, we have achieved our growth in part through supply chain
excellence – delivering the merchandise our customers need and want. In doing
so, we draw upon a global network of suppliers and factories in diverse
industries.
- Walmart’s Annual report, 2014
On the contrary, Nike specifically focuses on the apparel industry as its playing
ground and aims to achieve such growth and corporate-level recognition in this industry.
The continuous mention of becoming a leader in this industry is a clear instantiation of
the corporate logic that is industry-specific, which differentiates itself from the multiindustry corporate logic. The following excerpts provide the example of how an industryspecific corporate logic of Nike guides the organization. Nike’s corporation logic focuses
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on the reputation management in the apparel industry, and becoming a leader in the
industry by doing so.
This year we published our first Corporate Responsibility Report in three years.
Is it a risk? Maybe, but this kind of transparency can be key to unlocking
collaboration. The industry is changing, and we believe the best way to deal
with change is to create it
- Nike’s Corporate Responsibility Report, 2005
We’re (equally) committed to leading our industry and gaining market share
and continuous growth. We’re entering a new era of open-source collaboration
that commits to sharing intellectual and patent property. - Nike’s Annual report,
2014
4.3.3. Logic Hybridization Process
Logic hybridization is a unique process, differentiating itself from other processes
of “blending of diverse elements” of logics (Thornton et al., 2012), and is not a simple
aggregation of multiple logics that exist but more an integration of goals through specific
material forms (York et al., 2016). Hybridization of logics at the organizational level is
widely studied (e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smets et al., 2012; Lounsbury &
Crumley, 2007), and more recently hybridization of logics at the field level is also
increasingly explored, as it helps to illuminate the building blocks of new practices,
organizations, and governance mechanisms (York et al., 2016; Battilana et al., 2012).
Based on the assessment of the data, I develop a theoretical model that explicates
the process of logic hybridization process, through two aspects of hybridization:
hybridization of ideals and values, and hybridization of practices. In the first process of
hybridization of ideals and values, the two firms, Patagonia and Walmart, bring
incompatible logics that need to be hybridized. The hybridization processes of ideals and
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values show many complex situations where one founding firm’s logic dominates
interchangeably and intermittently. Hence the first process is dominating.
4.3.3.1. Dominating
During the earlier periods of coalition formation, some institutional logics become
prioritized over others in shaping organizational decisions. In the case of the SAC, the
initial conversations were started by an unlikely partnership of two individuals in
Walmart and Patagonia. Rick Ridgeway, the VP of Sustainability at Patagonia, was
approached by Duane Fox, the executive at Walmart. Rick was asked to give an
educational session on sustainability at Walmart headquarters following a deliberate
effort to change sustainability practices in their factories (Appendix 2). During these
visits to Walmart, the two organizations devised up the groundwork for building the
SAC. However, Walmart was adamant about making sure the SAC was done on
Patagonia’s principles, far different from what Walmart was used to or had knowledge in
(Kibbey, 2016). The values and practices associated with Patagonia, hence the proenvironmental community logic, influenced the guiding principles of the SAC in the
initial phase. The following quote from a media interview with Fox articulates an analogy
to a describe the dominating relation between Walmart and Patagonia as they discussed
working together:
Ridgeway agreed to work with Fox and Walmart, and it was during those sessions
that the idea for a broader effort, aimed at setting industry- wide metrics, took
root. Someone suggested calling the project David and Goliath. “Sure, but on one
condition,” replied a Walmart exec. “You’re Goliath and we’re David.” (San
Francisco Post, 2011)
However, as the SAC evolved into something more real over time, Walmart and
Patagonia together wanted to have a tangible outcome for the organization to incorporate
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a specific practice, instead of “relying on the bigger picture of what we want to achieve, it
was more about what are the specific things (we) can achieve with this organization”
(Kibbey, 2016). As such, the organization embarked on a journey to create a
measurement index for sustainable practices in the apparel industry and called it the Higg
Index. As the legwork for this index progressed, they sought for examples that could
provide the foundations of this metric. Nike, having undergone the reputation issue
associated with the sweatshops, had internally created a sustainability measurement index
called the Nike Considered Index, which was an effort on Nike’s part to counter the
negativity around the company. This was enough motivation for Patagonia and Walmart
to approach Nike to join their efforts in shaping the SAC and its core practice, creating
the Higg Index. Hence, the instantiation of Nike’s foundational institutional logic –
industry-specific corporation logic that emphasizes the reputation restoration of the firm
in the industry – permeates the SAC and dominates to create the assessment tool for the
self-regulatory institution. The below quote from a media interview captures this process
of Walmart executive Mary Fox approaching Nike to come on board with SAC with their
expertise and experiences in creating a sustainability measurement index:
On a series of conference calls, Mary Fox did her best to convince Nike that
Walmart was serious about sustainability. “They were pummeling me with
questions,” she recalled. Getting Nike was critical because the company had
built a design tool and database, called the Nike Considered Index that Nike built
to restore their reputation. Later, Nike agreed to make its database public and
share it with the coalition. (SF Gate, 2011)
4.3.3.2. Contesting
Once the coalition officially came into effect in June of 2009, the major activity
was creating the Higg Index and getting more members to join the coalition. Constructing
the Index was “many many rounds of discusions” (Kibbey, 2016), and did not happen in
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a short time. Especially since they had Nike Considered Index as a reference to guide the
foundations, it incurred less of groundwork. However, when it came to selecting the
items for measurement, or crafting the dimensions of sustainability, it became evident
that the clash of the multi-industry corporation logic instantiated in Walmart and the
industry-specific corporation logic embedded in Nike was inevitable. The following
except from the interview with the CEO of SAC illustrates the dilemmas and
contestations around the values and practices associated with different logics that the
SAC had to face as they were having these discussion around constructing the Higg
Index.
…They had a very different idea of how the Index should look like. Basically, it
was just for the industry, but Walmart was always thinking about, what about
other industries, not apparel, and then that was a whole new discussion..
(Kibbey, 2016)
The corporation logic of a multi-industry field actor like Walmart embodies a
different type of understanding around what sustainability is. Sustainability concerns are
variable depending on the industry, and the values and practices around achieving
sustainability differs by industry. For example, the solar energy industry compared to the
oil industry poses a different set of criteria around sustainability, solely due to its industry
effects. The solar energy industry is built around the business model of creating energy
efficiency through using solar power, while the oil industry inherent contains
sustainability threats due to the nature of its business. Considering these differences,
third-party sustainability measurement indexes, such as the MSCI index, often have
industry effects adjusted. Moreover, economists recognize the different sets of
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constraining macro-economic factors for intra-industry economic activities and multiindustry economic activities (Balassa & Bauwens, 1987).
Evidently, Walmart was portraying the assumptions and beliefs around what
sustainability should be alluding to the diverse industries that they were operating in,
which at times posed conflicting elements with Nike’s own sustainability index, which
was based entirely on the apparel and footwear industries. The index was designed
specifically to include items in the areas that Nike was focused on to restore reputation,
such as items for measuring environmental pollution in the labor oversight in the
facilities that Nike owned overseas.
4.3.3.3. Assimilating
..So at the end of the day, it was really just listening to what Patagonia was
putting forward in terms of their ideals and what they believed in, but taking bits
and pieces from Nike’s metrics, and Walmart’s success in everyday operations in
the supply chain and merging them together…essentially..(Kibbey, 2016)
As the above quote suggests, following a series of contesting of multi-industry
corporation logics and industry-specific ones, creating the Higg Index required the
assimilation of all three disparate logics of the founding organizations. Ultimately, the
assimilation processes of both values and practices over time incurred a set of new values
and practices that were hybridized by constructing new frames, practices, and
arrangements that integrate previously incompatible goals (York et al., 2016). This is
summarized in Figure 3.
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4.3.4. Hybridized ‘sustainability’ logic
The sustainability logic guiding the SAC is a new logic that contains novel values
and practices, nonexistent in the founding firm’s logics. In particular, the new sets of
values that emerged through this process are interdependence and transformation, and the
new practices are standardization and self-assessment. In terms of interdependence and
collaboration values, they differ from the existing firms’ set of logics in that the founding
firms recognized the competences and weaknesses of eachother throughout the
hybridization processes, and began allocating the roles and processes to eachother based
on competence and experience, foregoing their own set of values pertaining to the
original logic. In terms of practices, the need to have a set of practices that govern the
activities of the coalition stemmed out of one of the founding firms’ practices, but failed
to be instilled, which called for a new way of organizing and constructing practices,
based on self-assessment. Also, the self-regulatory institution engages in a series of
behaviors that aims for the standardization of sustainability assessment for the industrywide stakeholder group. A comparison of the new hybridized logic for the SAC is
portrayed in Table 8, and the illustrative evidence of the logics of the coalition is
elaborated in Table 9.
4.3.4.1. Interdependence
The first value that emerged for the SAC is interdependence. Interdependence can
be conceptualized utilizing systems dynamics theory and goal interdependence theory.
System dynamics theory is based on systems thinking suggests the realization of
interdependence of components in a system, and the change in one component impacting
the nature of the whole system (Sterman, 2000; Forrester, 1997; Luenberger, 1979).
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Conceptualizing the apparel industry as a system of organizations and stakeholders that
are co-dependent on eachother, SAC recognizes that the positive and negative actions of
firms impact eachother and the whole industry in complex ways. This is at the core of
trying to organize SAC to solve sustainability issues rather than firms working separately
to achieve such outcomes, as exemplified in their mission statement: “by joining forces in
a Coalition, we can address the urgent, systemic challenges that are impossible to change
alone.”
Goal interdependence theory further informs the emergence of the
interdependence value for SAC. Deutsch (1949) argued that people's beliefs about how
their goals are related determine the way in which they interact, which in turn affects
their performance and group cohesiveness. The interdependent goal drives firms to
achieve positive outcomes and find new opportunities to work together (Beersma et al.,
2003). SAC insinuated an interdependent goal that requires the effort of each member to
contribute, and recognized the alternative was not beneficial, as illustrated in the
following quote from a media interview.
A key reason why the companies agreed to work on common metrics around
environmental and social issues was that, when it came to labor and workplace
issues, they had already learned how wasteful and messy it is to go it alone.
(Media interview of CEO of SAC)
4.3.4.2. Transformation
Industry change was a core driver of the SAC since its launch. The following
quote from the CEO of SAC illustrates the importance of change and transformation and
how it acts to utilize the sustainability measurement index as the driver of change in the
apparel industry.
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In time there will just be a very large stream of data out there that gives a very
deep picture about the social and environmental impacts of the supply chain. I
would like us to be really seeing big movement on changing them and improving
them…Our real focus right now is to prove our theory of change; that
measurements and commitments to improve can lead to bigger changes. And
that’s hard. It’s a big, hard industry to improve, and it keeps me up at night – but
I’m optimistic when I see how committed so many people in it are to make that
happen. (Kibbey, 2016)
SAC is committed to driving change within (among its members), but also at a
broader level to inflict institutional change. Institutional change is often a “dialectical
interplay between . . . actions (practices and structures), meanings, and actors” (Zilber,
2002: 235). As this process diffuses throughout an organization or among organizations
in a given field, new norms and practices gain more legitimacy and, in turn, become
institutionalized (Greenwood et al., 2002; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). SAC
foresees it role in the industry as this change agent and a leader of voluntary
transformation, and not a reactive, short-term solution to the reputation issue for the
industry, as noted by the following quote:
We’re not trying to make an industry less bad…We’re trying to create a platform
for continuous improvement with some very lofty goals. (SAC CEO Interview)
4.3.4.3. Standardization and self-assessment through the Higg Index
After the inception of the SAC, the Higg Index was the main practice that the
SAC used to instill sustainability and permeate the everyday operations of every
organization in the apparel industry. The components of the Higg Index are detailed in
Appendix 3 and the general guidance for using the Higg Index is attached in Appendix 4.
The objective of the Higg Index (as defined by the SAC) is to “inform organizations of
their strengths/weaknesses, drive business value throughout the value chain by presenting
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opportunities for cost-savings and innovation, and catalyze sustainability education and
collaboration.” At present, the Higg Index is only a self-assessment tool. The need for a
consumer-facing label has been identified, but no timetable has been set. During a set of
interviews, the CEO of the Sustainable Apparel Coalition stated “the index reflected our
search for the particles of sustainability.”
Corporate sustainability is measured through indices from third parties such
MSCI and Dow Jones as a complement to their overall financial and credit rating or
independent sustainability-focused organizations such as Sustainalytics. These agencies
assess the firm’s sustainability through qualitatively and quantitatively examining the
environmental, social, and governance components, and many indices are measured using
both internal and external information (Cravens et al., 2003). Many scoring of
components are attained through surveys that the firms voluntarily provide, while other
scores are based on an assessment of the firm by the rating agency through qualitative
examination or survey results to consumers and public opinion. This is a common, widely
used method of scoring for many intangible firm outcomes, such as sustainability or
reputation. For instance, reputation is measured through multiple stakeholders valuating
organizational reputation through an assessment of the company’s actions, demographics,
performance, and affiliations (Lange et al. 2011; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Many gaps
can exist in doing so, and organizational reputation can be impacted through stakeholder
perceptions gaps between the employee and customer perceptions of the corporate brand
(Davies & Chun, 2002). Much like reputation, sustainability is also measured through
external accounts supplemented by internal surveys (Cravens et al., 2003).
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The main difference of the SAC’s Higg Index is that it is not a third-party
assessment and not a certification scheme. These external measurements and
certifications usually involve expert intermediaries where they provide evaluations based
on specialized expertise (Fombrun, 1996; Rindova et al., 2005). However, the Higg Index
is a core practice that the organizational members of the SAC collaborate on internally,
and hence the instantiation of the members’ belief structures. Through building this index
together, the coalition “went back and forth” between the founding organizations’ logics,
and continually updates the instantiations of the beliefs of its growing members. It is thus
a recursive process of hybridization that impacts the industry overall. The CEO of the
SAC is not hesitant to claim that “the Higg Index is what will drive the industry’s norms
around sustainability in the coming years” (Kibbey, 2016).
Although the Higg index is not a certification scheme, it still is a way to push a
standard way of measuring sustainability for the industry. Standardization is one of the
institutional strategies identified by Lawrence (1999) and often used to stabilize and an
institution (Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012; Werle, 2001) or diffuse a practice (Didier &
Brunson, 2004). Hence, the Higg Index serves this purpose and may result in an
“embedding process of a hybridized logic” (York et al., 2016) for the apparel industry
over time.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I developed and tested two research questions in regards to
sustainability in the apparel industry: 1) how does the threat and opportunity perceptions
around sustainability following a reputation crisis impact the joining of a coalition; and 2)
for those firms that initiate a coalition, what is the process of creating a hybridized logic
for the collective? The results of a mixed methods study provide support for the idea that
the different ways firms perceive of sustainability following a reputation crisis impacts
the joining of the coalition, and firms with disparate institutional logics undergo a
complex hybridization process as they build a coalition together.
To address the first research question, the analysis using a Cox Model predicted
that threat attention firms (those firms that perceive sustainability as a threat) would
positively impact the joining of a self-regulatory institution, and results showed that this
was supported. Contrary to expectations, opportunity attention, financial performance,
and visibility did not have a significant relationship to the event of joining in a coalition.
For the second research question, I conducted an inductive case study of the Sustainable
Apparel Coalition and its founding organizations – Patagonia, Walmart, and Nike – and
found that the founding organizations had different salience of their institutional logics
and had to hybridize them over time to construct a novel sustainability logic for the
Coalition. Going through dominating, contesting, and assimilating phases, the three
founding firms ultimately created a hybridized logic to guide the SAC, which included a
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new set of values – interdependence and transformation – as well as novel practices such
as self-assessment and standardization.

5.1. Theoretical Contributions
In general, the findings make an important contribution to the literature on
institutional theory and institutional change in particular by highlighting that institutional
change is often initiated by self-regulatory institutions that are built after a reputation
crisis. Firms that perceive of sustainability issues as a potential threat are more likely to
engage in these self-regulatory institutions. This study highlights that self-regulatory
institutions are built through an emergent process of logic hybridization by a few
organizations that start working together. In addition, this study contributes to the
research on sustainability and explicates a way to achieve sustainability by collaborating.
Moreover, the findings raise a number of important questions and issues that research has
yet to address. I discuss the contributions and important implications for research below.
The first study contributes to understanding reputation and self-regulatory
institutions further. The study explicates another dimension to understanding the
reputations commons problem (Yue & Ingram, 2012; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002) by
including threat attention to sustainability as a factor in explaining collective behavior
following a reputation crisis. Research on self-regulatory institutions have identified
motivations behind why firms generally engage in such collectives such as shared
resources and negativity distribution (Ostrom, 2004; King & Lenox, 2000), but has not
addressed the source of disparate behaviors among firms in the same industry when
engaging in collective behavior. Bringing in attention – threat attention in particular –
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helps to tease out which among the firms participate in self-regulatory behavior earlier
than others. The findings contextualize explanations around self-regulatory institutions
and carry insights into studying the firm-level factors. The current study included
differences in attention to sustainability along with financial performance and visibility,
but other firm-level factors could also be studied to further identify why firms show
dissimilar behaviors towards self-regulatory behavior.
The second study makes a number of theoretical contributions to institutional
theory and institutional logics. First, prior work on institutional logics have long been
interested in how organizational behavior stems from, enabled and bounded by
institutional arrangements (e.g. Rao et al., 2003; Friedland & Alford, 1991), and more
recently also how actors, in and out of organizations, shape and change institutions (e.g.
Battilana, Leca, Boxenbaum, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Greenwood & Suddaby,
2006). Hence, the institutional logics perspective helps to explain both top-down and
bottom-up processes existent in this cyclical, dynamic nature of the relationship between
industry and organization. Scholars have noted that logics are the sources of conflict and
negotiation between institutional orders (Pache & Santos, 2010; cf. Thornton et al., 2012)
and have the potential to impact organizations and industries. Through the examination of
the SAC, I explicate specifically the bottom-up process of how organizations can impact
the industry through institutional logics, and particularly a hybridized logic that a selfregulatory institution embodies. Hybridized logic at the field-level results from the
interplay of organizational responses and field-level conditions (York et al., 2016), and
often field-level change is socially constructed by organizations through the decisionmaking and recursive aggregation of responses to institutional complexity (Greenwood et
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al., 2011). By creating a self-regulatory institution such as the SAC, I find that the
apparel industry is able to manage these recursive processes between the organizations
and the industry to create a specific idea of sustainability and the relevant practices
around it, such as developing the Higg Index. Prior work has noted the need to extend
and identify more change-entrepreneurs and the role of those actors in managing tensions
during institutional change processes (Dacin et al., 2002; Rao et al., 2000), and this study
identifies one such organization like the SAC as one of these change actors.
While the findings are derived from a unique context and industry, they suggest a
broader and generalizable set of insights for understanding logic hybridization and
development. The anteceding processes of dominating, contesting, and assimilating
between the founding firms’ logics texturize the hybridization process as a complex but
sequential process, rather than a single characterization of competing logics as being
dominant or contesting (Strang & Meyer, 1993; Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009;
Murray, 2010). This is especially important in conceptualizing the logic hybridization
process as an emergent process with numerous interdependencies among the
organizational actors who enact institutional logics (Glynn, 2000; Heimer, 1999).
Although the analysis and findings from this study remain at the firm level, it is evident
that it is the most prominent organizational actors (e.g. Yvon Chouinard for Patagonia)
that enact certain institutional logics versus others.
This study also makes significant contributions to the understanding of selfregulatory institutions. Self-regulatory institutions (voluntary decentralized institutions)
are extensively studied by scholars to understand the prospects around organizations
coordinating their activities to achieve common ends (cf. Ingram & Silverman, 2002).
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While the motivation and impact of these institutions are comprehensively researched, a
detailed account of the anteceding process of creating a self-regulatory institution is
missing. In particular, research has yet to fully understand the initiators of self-regulatory
institutions. By focusing on the three founding organizations of SAC, this study garners a
deeper understanding of those who are motivated to not only participate in collectives
such as SAC, but rather inclined to start it. Lenox (2006) noted that self-regulation of
firms may provide a mechanism for credibly communicating their superiority along some
unobserved benefit, hence giving a signaling benefit. Grounded on this argument, the
founding organizations of SAC may have been motivated to start such collective effort
due to the signaling benefit stemming from a deeper need to communicate their messages
about sustainability as more superior than others. This notion was prevalent in Walmart
in particular, but bringing Patagonia on board as a partner in initiating the SAC was
critical to gain credence on their message and communication in regards to sustainability.
Similarly for Nike, being affiliated with the two other organizations enabled the firm to
gain affiliation benefits of self-regulation (Ostrom et al., 1994), and they are willing to
endure the greater cost of participation to remedy their reputation, as firms
disproportionately bear the cost of poor industry reputation (Lenox, 2006).
Finally, both studies extend the strategic view of sustainability. While many
sustainability researchers have viewed pursuing sustainability as either a source of
competitive advantage for an organization through acquiring and utilizing natural
resources to its advantage (Hart, 1995; Hart & Dowell, 2011) or another domain of
measuring the performance of the firm (Elkington, 1997), this study portrays how firms
can cooperate rather than find competitive advantages when pursuing outcomes like
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sustainability. Prior work has identified a relational view around competitive advantage
utilizing network-level cooperation (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), and the findings
from this study adds to this stream of work by identifying sustainability as a strategic
move where firms may be better off when collaborating versus competing. In particular,
negative reputation issues that can arise in the sustainability context indicates a reputation
commons problem (King, Lenox, Barnett, 2002; Yue & Ingram, 2012; Winn et al., 2008),
and creates a need to understand the process of how firms cooperate to solve such
problems. The case study of the apparel industry and the creation of the SAC serves as a
meaningful context to observe the cooperation for sustainability. In addition,
sustainability is often conceptualized an institution-building process (Bansal, 2002;
2005), and is a process that takes time and effort to achieve. This study adds another
avenue alongside this research by framing sustainability as a novel institutional logic for
an industry such as the apparel industry, indicating that it emerges from a hybridization
of corporation and community logics. This conceptualization invites numerous
opportunities to identify other types of sustainability logics within and outside of the
apparel industry.
Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to provide a better understanding of the
question, how does an institutional logic emerge, develop, and stabilize in the industry?
Firms engage in self-regulatory institutions and show different levels of proactivity. In
the initial phase of creating a self-regulatory institution, dominant logics may prevail
when logics contest (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Purdy & Gray, 2009), and conflicting
logics may coexist (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Besharov & Smith,
2014). Also, hybridization of logics may incur a new form of logics (Battilana & Dorado,
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2010; York et al., 2016). This study adds to the understanding of this complex nature of
logic emergence and development by explaining the process through the contestation of
the founding firms’ distinct, sets of logics, and a hybridization process of them over time
through the practice of developing a sustainability measurement index. It thereby
generally contributes to understanding the processes towards achieving sustainability,
building on the notion that we can only measure progress towards sustainability, rather
than describing its absolute state (Azapagic & Perdan, 2000).

5.2. Practical Implications
This study also brings several insights to practice. First, the worth of a
measurement index for sustainability discussed in this study can be of value to companies
and industries that are equally interested in encouraging sustainable practices. Finding the
best way to measure sustainability has increasingly been on the agenda for companies
and international organizations (Thomas & McElroy, 2015). However, it is difficult to
discern the best way to measure sustainability due to the variation in definition and
constituents across industries, companies, and even within companies. Hence, many
industries look outward to professional associations that provide guidelines for their
members to attain ecological as well as social sustainability. A common way to support
such aspirations is the awarding of sustainability prizes, which is widely recognized to
encourage sustainability practices (Fombrun, 2005). Another initiative concerning
sustainability partially initiated by the United Nations is the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) launched in 1997. Its aim is to help companies to create reports on their
sustainability in a standardized and therefore transparent and comparable way (GRI,
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2006). The GRI guidelines propose the operationalization of sustainability through a
multitude of indicators concerning a firm’s performance in the economic, environmental
and social spheres and can be regarded as guidelines to attain conformance with the goals
formulated by the United Nations Global Compact. In addition, private organizations also
attempt to measure sustainability, such as Sustainanalytics, a global responsible
investment research firm specialized in environmental, social and governance (ESG)
research and analysis. The firm offers global perspectives and solutions that are
underpinned by local expertise, serving both values-based and mainstream investors that
integrate ESG information and assessments into their investment decisions. They provide
yearly scoring on ESG domains for global firms, including their constituents and the
overall sustainability score. The scoring is based on both quantitative and qualitative
assessment of firms.
The case study of SAC presents an alternative to the aforementioned third-party
measurement indices, by showcasing an example of how companies can organically
create their own index instead of relying on external-driven measurements. This is
particularly needed to capture the industry-specific nuances and concerns and incorporate
them into the indices. The Higg Index is able to do this, since it is updated real-time
utilizing a platform that the member firms can access and revise. For example, if a novel
waste reduction method about a member firm’s manufacturing facility is uploaded on the
Higg Index platform, and amendments are suggested to take it into account, other
members are able to access the information and provide their input and ways to better
capture the new development (Kibbey, 2016). This instantaneous developments help to
make a more fine-grained analysis of sustainability for the member firms in SAC.
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A second practical implication for practice stems from the organizational structure
of SAC. While SAC is a self-regulatory institution started by the three member firms, it
differentiates itself from trade associations or other collectives in the industry by having a
separate top management team. Currently, the top management team of the SAC includes
the CEO, COO, VP of Product, VP of Membership, Growth, and Impact, and VP of
Europe. Other staff include product managers, member services manager, membership
coordinator, project directors in US and Europe, director of business development, and
communication and public affairs managers. None of the top management team or staff
members are part of any member organization, but recruited based on their experience
and expertise in sustainability across different industries. This organizational structure
allows the SAC to be independent and objective when developing the Higg Index, but
provides a benefit to the industry by gathering a group of people with expertise in
sustainability in various fields. For example, one of the vice presidents have expertise in
the LEEDS certification system for buildings, and holds a masters degree in urban
planning. The diversity of expertise within the team helps to deepen the knowledge about
sustainability and helps to build a balanced view about how to achieve sustainability
without being confined to a single industry.
Lastly, this study suggests companies to find uncommon partnerships and build
ties outside of their boundaries. The non-obvious partnership between the three founding
organizations, Patagonia and Walmart in particular, and the logic hybridization process
among them helped them to build a different kind of collective than what is expected
from working within the immediate strategic group. Unconventional partnerships often
yield benefits to both parties. HP’s Sustainability and Social Innovation Group director,
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Paul Ellingstad, mentioned that “real, genuine, messy collaboration involves reaching out
to unconventional organizations that your company may never have worked with before.
A rule of thumb to keep in mind: If it feels uncomfortable, overwhelming and
challenging, you’re probably on the right track. If it were easy, these models of
collaboration would have been done before” (Ellingstad & Love, 2013). The messy
pathway that the founding organizations persisted through helped to build the SAC into a
model of collaboration that recognized the need to build a sustainability measurement
index, recruit a separate top management team, and increase its membership to include
one third of the industry’s major players.

5.3. Limitations and future research
However, this work is not without limitations and there are two potential areas to
note. First, the use of a single industry is a potential limitation of this dissertation. Using
a single industry is frequently used in strategy (Sharp, Bergh, & Li, 2013) as well as
institutional theory (Davis & Marquis, 2005). However, questions remain on whether the
findings from the dissertation has potential to be generalized to other settings. While the
apparel industry is unique in its anecdotal evidence regarding sustainability and the
formation of a collective to deal with sustainability issues, it is also likely that the
findings of this dissertation can be generalized to settings with similar sustainability
issues. As such, I encourage future research to investigate potentially other industries that
have created such self-regulatory institutions to deal with sustainability-related issues,
including the coffee industry, energy industry, or the forestry industry to name a few.
Also, other non-sustainability organizations that are voluntarily formed to promote a
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specific cause or create an industry standard could be additionally studied to understand
the bottom-up processes of firms collaborating to impact the industry and create
institutional change.
The second potential limitation lies within the data. The data consists of a vast
amount of archival data at industry, coalition, and firm levels. The interview with the
SAC complements the archival data, but is limited at the coalition-level. The firm-level
interview data with the three founding firms of SAC is missing, and could uncover the
intricate processes that underlie the hybridization process. While it is common to have a
substantial amount of missing data in management studies that utilize archival data from
multiple data sources (e.g., Barnett & Salomon, 2012; Schijven & Hitt, 2012), it is a
potential limitation in that the data could be skewed towards SAC’s perspective rather
than the respective firms’ perspectives. This perpetrates the possibility that the founding
firms may have a different idea around why they engaged in the SAC. Moreover, the
sequence or phase of the logic hybridization process could have been different from the
firms’ points of view. One potential area for future research could be identifying and
explaining the tensions between the founding firms, other member organizations who
have joined later, and the SAC. Accounting for all three perspectives and observing the
tensions that lie between them would generate exciting findings that further suggests
implications about the interplay of institutional logics, self-regulatory institutions, and
sustainability.
Important research extensions exist from the findings in this study. First, the next
research trajectory of this study would be to track the impact of the Higg Index to the
overall industry to calculate the adoption rate and diffusion patterns. The diffusion of
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such index is crucial to the successful dominance of the institutional logic that the
coalition strives to infuse in the industry. Especially, the paper explores the top-down
effects of new institutional orders and belief structures embedded in the SAC impacts
other organizations in the industry and beyond. Secondly, the study opens up an
opportunity to articulate the different stages of logic hybridization depending on critical
external events in the industry. This study is limited to the sweatshop crisis as the trigger
for the emergence of sustainability-related norms to pervade the industry, but there can be
many critical junctures during the process of logic hybridization, where one founding
firm may be impacted on a larger scale than others, and vice versa. This will enrich the
understanding of the hybridization process as well as find points of conflict and tension
within these processes to articulate the hybridization process as a non-linear, complex
process of negotiations among the parties involved.

5.4. Conclusion
In summary, the purpose of this dissertation was to explore the apparel industry’s
sustainability efforts through a self-regulatory institution, the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition. The findings demonstrate both the reputation crisis impacting the disparate
timing of firms joining the self-regulatory institution, and the process of creating a selfregulatory institution through logic hybridization by the initial members. Ultimately, the
dissertation paves an understanding of the emergence of a new, distinct ‘sustainability
logic’ in the form of a hybridized logic instantiated by the self-regulatory institution. This
makes a substantial contribution to the institutional logics literature, where very little
research has examined the emergence of a new logic resulting from the hybridization of
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existing logics. The study also extends the understanding of self-regulatory institutions by
explicating its membership, especially the initiating organizations and their motivations.
It lastly adds to the sustainability literature by developing the notion of a sustainability
logic as a mechanism to promote sustainability in an industry through a collective. It is
my hope that the findings presented here will encourage researchers to allow greater
attention to the juncture between sustainability, self-regulatory institutions, and
institutional logics, and further probe the substantial impact of organizations on industries
through collaborating, rather than competing, to achieve outcomes such as sustainability.
Sustainability is an area of work that is a struggle and a learning process for many
practitioners and provides stimulating research questions and empirical settings for
academics to deeply engage in. I hope to contribute to building the body of knowledge
that adds its share to a network of inter-disciplinary scholars paving the path for a better
comprehension of sustainability. Eventually, I hope the continuous flow of theoretical
and practical endeavors to accomplish sustainability will echo the saying: if you want to
go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.
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Figure 1
Media coverage on the sweatshop crisis (1996-2005)
70
60
50
40

US - Nike sweatshop

30

Total

20
10
0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

77

Figure 2
Emergence of sustainability in the apparel industry
(1) Media coverage on sustainability in the apparel industry (U.S. and global 19902014)
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(2) Media coverage on sustainability in the apparel industry (U.S. 1990-2014)
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Process model of logic hybridization
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Table 1
Data sources and usage
Type
Archival corporate

Data source
Annual reports and
sustainability/corporate
responsibility reports

Use in the analysis
Track and identify the institutional logics of the founding
firms and the hybridization process

Press interviews

Archival - media

Archival - others

Interviews with
Sustainable
Apparel
Coalition

Autobiographical and
biographical books founding
firms and CEOs
Newspaper, magazine trade
journal articles, and press
releases from the Lexis Nexis
database on the industry and
founding firms
Industry reports on the apparel
industry from the S&P Capital
IQ Industry Surveys 1998 –
2015

Exemplify the magnitude of the sweatshop crisis for the
industry
Identify the development and increase of sustainability
conversations in the media post-crisis
Identify the development and increase of sustainability
conversations for investors in the apparel industry postcrisis

CEO and staff of the Sustainable Triangulate and confirm the findings in the archival
Apparel Coalition
sources
Further understand the values and practices of the SAC as
originating from values of practices of member firms
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Table 2
Word Frequencies for Three Founding Firms’ Threat and Opportunity Attention to
Sweatshop Crisis
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Threat

6

3

8

45

9

14

45

11

54

195

Opportunity 0

2

5

6

3

7

27

16

28

94

Others

6

8

19

10

2

14

29

22

165

1
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics

S.D.

5.341

0.244

4.125

0.983

-0.020*

3. High
Performance

6.402

2.981

-0.391

0.877

4. Low
Performance

1.202

0.908

0.590

0.529

-0.392

5. High
Visibility

0.783

1.209

-0.491

0.190

-0.298

-0.418

0.103

0.493

-0.198

0.146

0.039* -0.193

1. Threat
Attention
2.
Opportunity
Attention

6. Low
0.039
Visibility
* p<0.05 ** p < 0.01

1

2

82

3

4

5

Mean

Variables

6

Table 4
Cox Model of Coalition Membership
(1)
Nonadjusted
estimate

(2)
Hazard
ratio
95% CI

(3)
Adjusted
estimate

(4)
Hazard ratio
95% CI

(5)
P value

Attention
Threat
Opportunity

0.332
0.774

1.831
0.362

0.343**
1.224

5.478
3.133

0.050
0.127

Financial
performance
High
Low

0.223
0.662

1.366
0.331

0.879
0.520

1.224
0.134

0.135
0.234

0.145
0.266

1.226
1.252

0.564
0.147**

8.224
2.262

0.135
0.012

Risk
Factors

Visibility
High
Low

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5
Selected Illustrative Evidence of Founding Firms’ Logics

Patagonia

(1) Principles that the organization
identified as guiding their action

(2) Practices associated with the
principles

(3) Outcomes and Challenges

Use business to inspire and
implement solutions to the
environmental crisis (It’s business
that has to take the majority of the
blame…yet business can do good
things). (GS)

Whatever comes to the end of its
useful life needs to be recycled
or repurposed into something
new.

A social and environmental
initiative might start with
something that unarguably needs
doing. As they gain experience,
your colleagues will become more
aware of more nuanced, harder-tosport social and environmental
impacts, and of opportunities to
reduce them. They will start to
share a language and a cultural bias
that favors improvement. (RC)

One day it dawned on me that I
was a businessman and would
probably be one for a long time. I
would never be happy playing by
the normal rules of business. I
wanted to distance myself as far as
possible from those pasty-faced
corpses in suits I saw in airline
magazine ads. If I had to be a
businessman, I was going to do it
on my own terms. (Yvon
Chouinard)
..We can learn directly from
nature about who we are and how
to live (RC, p. 21)
Quality control was always
foremost in our minds, because it
a tool failed, it could kill someone,
and since we were our own best
customers, there was a good
chance it would be us. (RC)
We need to understand the true
cost – human, ecological,
economic – of everything we
make. (GC)
Many people seek to come to
Patagonia because they think the
company’s values coincide with
their own. (RC)

Once I reach that 80 percent
level, I like to go off and do
something totally different, that
probably explains the diversity
of the Patagonia product line,
and why our versatile,
multifaceted clothes are the most
successful.
Sometimes good ideas spring
from having a sense of where
you want to go, of having a
vision of the next level of
products.
You can’t wait until you have all
the answers before you act.
I took a dozen of my top
managers to Argentina..We
asked ourselves why we were in
business and what kind of
business we wanted Patagonia to
be…We talked about the values
we had in common and the
shared culture that had brought
everyone to Patagonia and not
another company.
We impose on ourselves an
annual tax of one percent of our
gross sales, or ten percent of
profits, whichever is greater to
local community and
environmental activism.

The most fundamental changes start
at the margins and move toward the
center (RC)
These include activities that
influence the larger corporate
community to also adjust its values
and behavior, and that support,
through activism and financially,
grassroots and national campaigners
who work to solve the current
environmental and social crisis.
“Never exceed your limits. You
push the envelope, and you live for
those moments when you are right
on the edge, but you don’t go over.
You have to be true to yourself; you
have to know your strengths and
limitations and live within your
means. The same is true for a
business. The sooner a company
tries to be what it is not, the sooner
it tries to “have it all.” The sooner it
will die.”

84

(4) First order themes

Simplicity

(5) Second order
themes
Ecological
commitment

Quality
Paradox

Community
Engagement

New rules of
business/Pioneering

Non-traditional
Business

Natural (Nature)
Social
Movement
Community engagement
Ecological well- being

(6)
Foundational
Institutional
logic
Proenvironmental
community
logic

We needed to blur that distinction
between work and play and
family.
I would like a more restrained, or
“natural” growth.
In every long-lasting business, the
methods of conducting business
may constantly change, but the
values, the culture, and the
philosophies remain constant.
Walmart

Living simply, work hard. Low
cost and supply chain excellence.
(Website)
Saving people money to help them
live better was the goal that Sam
Walton envisioned when he
opened the doors to the first
Walmart in 1962. And it remains
our focus today. We continue to
find ways to reduce costs
throughout our supply chain while
bringing quality products to our
shelves. That means a lot to the
millions of customers who shop
with us (Mission statement)
Wal-mart strived to conduct its
business in a manner that reflects
its beliefs and expects its suppliers
to adhere to these beliefs in their
contracting, subcontracting, and
other business relationships.
Additionally, because the conduct
of Wal-mart’s suppliers can be
attributed to Walmart and its
reputation, Wal-mart requires its
suppliers and their contractors, to
meet the following standards, and
reserves the right to make
periodic, unannounced audits of
suppliers’ facilities and the
facilities of suppliers’ contractors
to ensure suppliers’ compliance
with these standards.

Patagonia encourages pro-active
stances that reflect our values.
“Open book policy” enables
employees easy access to
decisions…we encourage open
communication, a collaborative
atmosphere with maximum
simplicity, while we
simultaneously seek dynamism
and innovation.
“We began implementing team
audits (for labor practices) in
2005. Our goal for 2006 is to
have team audits in 100 percent
of the high-risk geographic
regions” (AR 2006))
We increased the number of
auditors to ensure that audits in
certain geographic regions are
conducted in pairs (AR 2005)
All factories are audited at least
once and up to four times a year
as needed. The time between
audits is based on the results of
the previous audit: the better the
results, the longer the time
between assessment. This
program is structured to provide
motivation for improvement and
bring about positive change at
the factory level. The reward for
compliance is less frequent
audits.
We are looking to expand our
ethical standards team by
approximately 15 percent by the
end of 2006. We also have new
headcount budgeted for 2006.
We trained more than 11,000
suppliers and factory
management members on ethics
and sustainability.

Wal-mart began to publish their
first all-around sustainability report
in 2009, while the previous ones
were limited to ethical sourcing.

Supply-chain excellence
Change in CEO
Cost reduction

Our associates and entire company
take pride in the role we play in
local communities, and the Walmart
Foundation has played an even
bigger role over the past year. Last
fiscal year, we donated $467
million to nonprofits in the United
States.
We see that sustainability is no
doubt one of Walmart’s greatest
opportunities to make a difference
for our business, our communities,
our customers, and the planet. We
did in fact “broaden and accelerate”
our commitment to sustainability
over the past year. I hope you wil
take away a real sense of our
company’s long-term commitment
to sustainability and my strong
personal commitment as well.
(Michael Duke, 2011)
Walmart is committed to being
open, transparent and sincere, when
we get things right and also when
we get things wrong. We recognize
that some might still have concerns
about our company, and we try our
best to address those concerns. (AR
2013)

At Wal-Mart, we have achieved
our growth in part through supply
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Cost and
efficiency

Audit
Relationships/Networks
Learning/Improvement

Supply chain and
networks
CEO
impact/leadership

(Multiindustry)
corporate
logic

chain excellence – delivering the
merchandise our customers need
and want. In doing so, we draw
upon a global network of suppliers
and factories. When we buy
merchandise, we realize that our
orders touch factory workers and
their communities around the
world. As we reflect on the impact
of our sourcing, we recognize that
success goes beyond financial
results alone. (Website)
Respect for the individual, Service
to customers, Striving for
excellence (Interview)
One of the most exciting parts of
my first year as CEO has been to
see the role that Wal-mart has
played on big issues that really
matter. It’s clear to me that
sustainability is an area where
Walmart leads, but it’s also an
area where we are known as a
leader. (Michael Duke, CEO,
2010)
Integrity, Opportunity, Family and
Community, Purpose,
Responsibility (5 Values) June
2012 CEO Interview
Nike

Like everyone, I view the world
through the lens of my
experiences. And so I’ll talk about
a few things I’ve learned along the
way and why I am committed to
building a more sustainable
company and future. (CEO letter
AR 2013)
It took us a while, but we finally
figured out that we could apply
these two core competencies –
design and innovation – to bring
about environmental, labor and
social change. We opened the
aperture of our lens and
discovered our potential to have a

…terrible tragedy in Bangladesh
garment factory last fall. Like
you, we were saddened and
disturbed by the senseless loss
of life, and we renewed our
dedication to being part of the
solution. We have instituted a
zero-tolerance policy: We will
terminate our relationship with
any supplier engaged in
unauthorized subcontracting.
This is a tough but critical
challenge – for us and others –
and we recognize that the
immense complexity of the
supply chain requires us to
partner with peers and
stakeholders to find sustainable
solutions.
As part of Wal-mart’s global
sustainability initiatives, the
audit criteria were expanded to
include additional environmental
components such as: waste
identification, waste handling
and disposal, wastewater
treatment and discharge, air
emissions, and banned
substances. The environmental
criteria were audited but not
considered in the factory
assessment. (2006)
With each new discovery and
partnership, we willingly gave
up old ideas to shift our thinking
toward a better, smarter, faster
and ultimately more sustainable
future – financially,
environmentally and socially.
As NIKE has grown and
changed, we have fundamentally
shifted our sustainability
strategy. Early on, we learned
that rather than just managing
our reputation by reacting to
criticism about our supply chain,
we could create real
opportunities for change by

Leading on big issues is not easy.
But the rewards are greater than we
thought possible when we set out
on this journey. We do have a
responsibility to lead, and we’ve
found that our responsibility is also
our opportunity…that what is good
for society and good for business
can be one and the same.
More and more, we are finding
ways to make them mutually
reinforcing. It drives our bottom
line more than we had expected, but
not only that – it brings us closer to
our customers. It helps us form
strong partnerships with
governments and communities in
the countries where we work. (AR
2013)

In the early ’90s, we came under
intense scrutiny for labor conditions
in our supply chain. Our critics
were smart (and right) to focus on
the industry leader. Our rst reaction
was to defend the practices
prevalent in developing economies.
Soon, however, we learned that the
path to change that status quo is
paved by collaboration with
multiple stakeholders. We had a lot
to learn, and there were people who
could coach us. In those days the
Internet was brand new, but we
began to see the power of
instantaneous information and new
communities enabled on a global
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Innovation and design

Growth/Reputation

Change in Reputation

Leadership

Growth/industry leader
Stakeholders/
collaboration

(Industryspecific)
Corporate
logic

positive influence on waste
reduction, climate change,
managing natural resources,
renewable energy and factory
conditions. We saw that doing the
right thing was good for business
today – and would be an engine
for our growth in the near future.
Sports created Nike, but design
and innovation made it grow. Our
challenge – and our opportunity –
is to use all three to help people
reach their true potential.
We have always obsessed over
performance – make it lighter,
faster, tougher, more relevant – all
to enhance the experience of sport
for all. In the early days our
“systems” consisted of only those
things that helped us build better
shoes and shirts, and ads and
events. We are, after all, a
consumer products company.
NIKE is dedicated to serving
athletes and helping them reach
their full potential. As a growth
company we are dedicated to
creating value for our
shareholders. The world in which
athletes and companies compete is
changing fast.
We believe business has a critical
role to play in meeting the
challenges of a changing world –
addressing climate change,
preserving the earth’s constrained
resources, enhancing global
economic opportunity – not by
reducing growth but by redefining
it.

creating an environment of
industry collaboration,
partnership and transparency.
This approach has continued to
evolve to one where we are
harnessing the power of
innovation to manage risks,
create opportunities and meet
our sustainability and social
goals, adding value to our
business and brand.
We established a new norm by
disclosing our contract factory
base back in 2005, and we still
believe transparency is essential
for industry change.

scale. We suspected that a new
model was being born – one that
would tap into the wisdom of
diverse contributors, where
collaboration was more important
than proprietary secrets. We learned
to view transparency as an asset,
not a risk.
If we are to enable systemic change,
we can’t do it alone. We need
partners. We need collaboration
from industry, civil society and
government.
These successes prove that Nike
can be a catalyst with significant
ripple effect.
But we know we can’t do
everything, and we can’t do it
alone. So we decided to focus on a
few key areas where we know we
can mobilize awareness and
commitment - with our employees,
our consumers, policy makers, civil
society and among members inside
and outside of our industry. And
that has made all the difference.
Over the past 15 years, we have
evolved from approaching
sustainability reactively as a
reputation management issue to
embracing it as a key driver of
innovation and an important source
of competitive advantage.
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Table 6
Ideal-Typical Logics of Community Vs. Corporation Logics

Categories

Community

Corporation

Root Metaphor

Common boundary

Corporation as hierarchy

Sources of Legitimacy

Unity of will
Belief in trust & reciprocity

Market position of firm

Sources of Authority

Commitment to community values and
ideology

Board of directors, Top Management

Sources of Identity

Emotional connection, ego-satisfaction
and reputation

Bureaucratic roles

Basis of Norms

Group membership

Employment in firm

Basis of Attention

Personal investment in group

Status in hierarchy

Basis of Strategy

Increase status & honor of members and
practices

Increase size and diversification of firm

Informal Control
Mechanism

Visibility of actions

Organizational culture

Economic system

Cooperative capitalism

Managerial Capitalism
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Table 7
Instantiation of Ideal-Typical Logics in Founding Firms
Logic
Organizational Forms
Corresponding founding
firm of SAC
Foundational perspective
Source of legitimacy
Source of identity
Source of authority

Basis of mission (norms)

Basis of attention

Basis of strategy

Pro-environmental
Community Logic
B Corporation

Corporation (multiindustry) logic
Public company
(multi-industry
retailer)
Walmart

Corporation (industry-specific)
logic
Public company (apparel brand
manufacturer)

Community,
Natural environment
Embeddedness in natural and
social environment and
reciprocity and unity
Individual
Natural environment
Individual ego-centric
reputation and emotional
connection

Corporate, Business,
For-profit
Market position of
firm

Corporate, Reputation

Corporate

Corporate

CEO
Public ownership

CEO
Public ownership

Ideal and vision
(e.g. Mission statement: “Use
business to inspire and
implement solutions to the
environmental crisis.”)
Inclusivness,
Cooperation with natural
environment

Maximize profits,
shareholder return,
network

Reputation
Image
Quality

Benchmarking,
Supply chain
excellence

External perceptions

Increase status of
organizational members and
practices

Growth in size

Growth in size and reputation
management

Patagonia
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Nike

Market position of the firm

Table 8
Extending the Ideal-Typical Logics in the Apparel Industry
Ideal-typical
logics in the
apparel
industry
Source of
identity
Source of
authority
Basis of
legitimacy
Basis of
attention
Basis of
strategy

Corporate

Hybrid
“Sustainability logic”
(as instantiated by SAC)

Community

Bureaucratic roles

Collective goals and initiative to
change
Detached expert management team

Emotional connection, egosatisfaction and reputation
Commitment to community
values and ideology
Unity of will
Belief in trust & reciprocity
Personal investment in group

Board of directors, Top
management
Market position of firm
Status in hierarchy
Increase size and
diversification of firm

Standardizing the way to measure
sustainability
Commitment to best practices and
vicarious learning
Collaboration among the firms in the
industry
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Increase status & honor of
members and practices

Table 9
Illustrative Evidence of Values and Practices of the Self-Regulatory Institution
Themes of Values
Interdependence

Representative Text
“By joining forces in a Coalition, we can address the urgent, systemic challenges that are impossible to
change alone.” (Mission statement)
“The time is right and the need is great for the apparel sector to move forward now, without further delay, in
unison, with strong partners like you.” (Pitch letter to firms 2009)
“A key reason why the companies agreed to work on common metrics around environmental issues was that,
when it came to labor and workplace issues, they had already learned how wasteful and messy it is to go it
alone.” (Media interview)
“The challenges facing our industry require collective action on a global scale.” (SAC website)

Transformation

“Transforming the apparel, footwear, and home textiles industry..” (SAC website)
“We’re not trying to make an industry less bad…We’re trying to create a platform for continuous
improvement with some very lofty goals.” (CEO Interview)
“This is about industry transformation so everyone can benefit from reduced risk as well as efficiency”(CEO
Interview)
Representative Text
“Standardization will enable us to maximize sustainability benefits for all buyers without investing in multiple
sustainability technologies and certification processes, and ultimately empower consumers to trust claims
regarding sustainably sourced apparel. Finally, as an industry, we will benefit from the unique opportunity to
shape policy and create standards for measuring sustainability before government inevitably imposes
one.”(Pitch letter to firms)
“By measuring sustainability performance, the industry can address inefficiencies, resolve damaging
practices, and achieve the environmental and social transparency that consumers are starting to demand.”
(Interview with CEO)
“We’re currently using the Higg Index to do self-assessments for a company’s internal use. We’ll be taking
results from those assessments to refine the Index itself and improve the quality of the data it collects. We will
then look at data validation and eventually verification of the Index outputs. Once the data becomes reliable
and extremely credible we’ll look at communicating the Index ratings to stakeholders and consumers.”
(Interview with CEO)

Themes of Practices
Standardization

Self-assessment

“As a fiber supplier, participation in working groups to develop the Higg Index keeps us more closely
connected to retail partners – creating more awareness of the needs of the entire supply chain – and helping
us to better meet the needs of our customers.” (Member interview: Lenzing)
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Appendix 1
Ideal-Typical Logics in the Inter-Institutional System (Thornton et al., 2012)
Y-Axis:
Categories
Root
Metaphor 1

Family 1
Family as firm

Community 2
Common
boundary

Sources of
Legitimacy 2

Unconditional
loyalty

Unity of will,
Belief in trust,
& reciprocity

Sources of
Authority 3

Patriarchal
domination

Sources of
Identity 4

Family
reputation

Basis of
Norms 5

Membership in
household

Commitment
to community
values &
ideology
Emotional
connection,
Egosatisfaction &
reputation
Group
membership

Basis of
Attention 6

Status in
household

Basis of
Strategy 7

Increase family
honor

Informal
Control
Mechanism 8
Economic
System 9

Family politics
Family
capitalism

X-Axis: Institutional Orders
Religion 3
State 4
Market 5
Temple as
State as
Transaction
bank
redistribution

Profession 6
Profession as
relational
network
Personal
expertise

Corporation 7
Corporation as
hierarchy

Importance of
faith &
sacredness in
economy &
society
Priesthood
charisma

Democratic
participation

Share price

Market position
of firm

Bureaucratic
domination

Shareholder
activism

Professional
association

Board of
directors, Top
management

Association
with deities

Social &
economic ties

Faceless

Association
with quality of
craft, personal
reputation

Bureaucratic
roles

Membership in
congregation

Citizenship in
nation

Self-interest

Employment in
firm

Personal
investment in
group
Increase status
and honor of
members and
practices
Visibility of
actions

Relation to
supernatual

Status of
interest group

Status in
market

Membership in
guild &
association
Status in
profession

Increase
religious
symbolism of
natural events
Worship of
calling

Increase
community
good

Increase
efficiency
profit

Increase
personal
reputation

Increase size &
diversification
of firm

Backroom
politics

Industry
analysts

Celebrity
professionals

Organizational
culture

Cooperative
capitalism

Occidental
capitalism

Welfare
capitalism

Market
capitalism

Personal
capitalism

Managerial
capitalism
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Status in
hierarchy

Appendix 2
Walmart – Change in Practices
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Appendix 3
Components of the Higg Index
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Appendix 4
Guidelines on Usage of the Higg Index

General Guidance

Higg Index 2.0
Feedback, Suggestions, or
Questions? Visit:
http://www.apparelcoalition.org/g
eneral-inquiries/

Purpose and Intended Use
• The Higg Index is a suite of self-assessment tools, called Modules, designed to measure the sustainability impacts of apparel
and footwear products across the value chain at the brand, product and facility levels. It is:
o a self-assessment tool that enables rapid learning through identification of environmental and social sustainability hot
spots and improvement opportunities;
o a starting point of engagement, education, and collaboration among stakeholders in advance of more rigorous assessment
efforts.
• The Higg Index is a learning tool for both small and large organizations to identify challenges and capture ongoing
improvement. It targets a spectrum of performance that allows beginners and leaders in environmental and social sustainability,
regardless of company size, to identify opportunities.
Scope
• The Higg Index was developed for apparel and footwear products to assess environmental and social/labor performance.
• The Environmental Modules are based on life-cycle thinking and span the apparel and footwear life cycle (materials,
manufacturing, packaging, transportation, use, and end-of-user). The Social/Labor Modules are based on the worker lifecycle and
were developed using based on the best available tools and frameworks.
The Higg Index 2.0 is not:
• A compliance tool - instead, it seeks to capture a spectrum of performance
• A manufacturer/facility selection tool - instead, it is a platform for engagement with value chain partners.
• A process-based environmental life cycle assessment (LCA)
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• A tool that can be used to communicate scores outside of your organization except as otherwise permitted under the Terms of
Use.
General Approach and Structure
• The Higg Index is a set of indicator-based tools designed to change behavior and promote continuous improvement. The Higg
Index asks practice-based, qualitative and quantitative questions to gauge environmental sustainability and social/labor
performance to drive behavior for improvement.
• The Higg Index is structured in five core modules to evaluate environmental sustainability performance at three levels – company
(brand or retailer) and facility (factory):
o Brand Module – Environment: Apparel (to assess apparel product-specific environmental practices at a brand level)
o Brand Module – Environment: Footwear (to assess footwear product-specific environmental practices at a brand level)
o Brand Module – Environment: Combined Apparel/Footwear (enables brands to combine apparel and footwear total scores based
on percent volume)
o Brand Module – Social/Labor: Apparel/Footwear - Beta (to assess apparel and footwear product-specific social and labor
practices at a brand level)
o Facility Module – Environment: Apparel/Footwear (to assess environmental performance of materials, packaging, manufacturing
supplier facilities)
o Facility Module – Social/Labor: Apparel/Footwear - Beta (to assess social and labor performance of materials, packaging,
manufacturing supplier facilities)
• Within each Module, there are major groups of content called sections (e.g. Materials and Manufacturing for environment; and
Policies and Employee Development for social/labor) and each section includes indicator questions.

Scoring
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• The scoring system of the Higg Index was designed to drive behavior change, however with the acknowledgment scoring is by
definition a subjective function and that it may be improved in future releases as more data, information and methodologies
become available and/or evolve.
• In The Higg Index, 2.0 points were heuristically assigned to each indicator question to potentially drive actions, decisions and
practices that lead to better sustainability outcomes.
• Points can only be gained. The Higg Index does not use negative points to penalize and positive points are awarded based on the
desired behaviors. Each module is scored independently.
• In the Higg Index, there are no performance “thresholds” for evaluating scores for facilities (e.g., ranges for “gold”, “silver”,
“bronze”). Centrally reported data would be required. It is up to each organization to determine how to interpret the scores from
facilities.
Section Weighting
• In The Higg Index each section in each Module is given a specific weighting to calculate the total score. Assigned weights for all
sections are based on SAC member input to enable consistent benchmarking and comparison.

Validation
The Higg Index is a self-assessment tool that does not require validated answers, unless organizations choose to conduct additional
verification on their own. The SAC does not provide validation services. Organizations should determine how much significance
they want to give scores and data in their own decision-making process. Scores may only be shared with current business partners
on a one-on-one basis and not for any commercial purpose or for public dissemination, except with the prior consent of the SAC.
• SAC understands the need for confidence in Higg Index assessment answers as well as the opportunity and benefit to
standardizing an audit protocol. We plan to develop a validation strategy that enables scalable validation, and will communicate
this in the future when it is ready..
• Higg Index Modules will enable organizations to self-declare the level of validation that each module has undergone (e.g.
phone, joint completion, on-site, self-validated, desktop, other). It is the decision and responsibility of each Module owner to
update their status and upload any supporting documentation.
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Third Party Certifications
and Standards
• Throughout the Index, there are references to third party certifications and standards. These are listed as examples only. SAC
does not officially endorse any standard or certification, nor does it reward different scores/points for one standard versus
another.
Using The Higg Index
Facilities that receive a request to complete a Facility Module in Excel are highly encouraged to also create a free web tool account.
Facilities that complete the module online may connect to and share their modules with other customers. To create an account, go
to www.higg.org.
Who Should Use the Higg Index
The Brand, Product, and Facilities modules ask questions about brand-level, product-level, and facility-level practices. As such, a
single person is unlikely to have all of the information needed to fill out all three modules.
• Each organization will likely want to designate a “champion” with overall responsibility for the Higg Index, and have this person
go through each section in each module and assign ownership.
Frequency of Use
• When using The Higg Index, all organizations are faced with complexities associated with the seasonality of their products and
operations. It up to each organization to figure out how to use the tool, according to a self-defined “acceptable” variance /
relativity / complexity. It is recommended however that organizations should use The Higg Index consistently in order to evaluate,
track, and monitor improvement opportunities.
Depth of Analysis
• It is up to each organization to decide the depth of analysis (e.g., how deep into the bill of materials, which trims to include,
whether to include labeling, packaging, etc.)
Supply Chain Engagement:
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• Engaging your supply chain partners is critical to successfully using The Higg Index. For example, a brand will not only want to
complete the Brand Module for its own operations, but will also want to request that its manufacturers fill out a Facility Module for
their facilities. A manufacturer will want to complete Facility Modules for their sites, but may also want to request a Brand Module
from its customers to learn what they are doing to encourage sustainable practices.

Higg Index Future
Development
• Standards and certification equivalencies: Define and incorporate Index “equivalencies”:
o In order to simplify the usability of the Index and recognize investments that brands, facilities, and suppliers have made
in key certifications or standards, SAC plans to evaluate these and determine where Index questions can be automatically filled in
based on achievement of a certain certification or standard. For example, the Index may have a checkbox asking for a specific
certification, and if checked it would auto-populate the corresponding questions in the Index.
• Verification of responses: SAC is considering developing a Higg Index verification process/protocol.

Higg Index Contact Information
Please see contact information on the SAC
website:

http://www.apparelcoalition.org/gener
al-inquiries/
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Appendix 5
Basic Interview Protocol
(1) Introduction
Could you give me a brief introduction of yourself and your position in the SAC?
(2) Motivation
How long have you worked here and why did you join?
(3) General Sustainability
Could you describe your interest in sustainability?
(4) Apparel Industry
How familiar are you with the apparel industry? Why did you get interested?
(5) Member Organizations
Could you tell me about the members of SAC?
(6) Creation of SAC
To what extend do you have knowledge about the creation of SAC?
How was SAC created?
Which members were initiating ideas to create SAC in the beginning?
(7) Founding Organizations
Could you tell me about Patagonia and SAC?
Could you tell me about Walmart and SAC?
Could you tell me about Niek and SAC?
(8) Higg Index
What is the story behind Higg Index?
What is the motivation to create the Higg Index?
(9) Values and practices
What are some of the values or principles that guide SAC?
What are the practices associated with them?
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